Expert: Netanyahu's Critics Misunderstand Decision-Making, Not Ignoring Warnings
An Israeli expert suggests that critics accusing Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of ignoring warnings before the October 7th Hamas attack misunderstand the complexities of decision-making and human psychology. Dr. Liraz Margalit, writing for "Maariv," argues that if reports are true that UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed warned Netanyahu ten days prior about a "large-scale event" orchestrated by Yahya Sinwar, dismissing this as mere negligence would be a mistake.
Margalit posits the issue is deeper, suggesting Netanyahu believed the threat pertained to Judea and Samaria and thus did not relay the information to security chiefs, though the Prime Minister's office denies such a conversation occurred. The core question, she states, is what worldview led the leader to not reconsider his fundamental assumptions upon receiving such a warning.
Netanyahu had cultivated an image as a strategist who foresaw threats, a perception shaped long before last fall. His long-held belief, dating back to 2017, was that Hamas was deterred by military pressure. This was later supplemented by an economic rationale, particularly the 2018 allowance of Qatari funds into Gaza, based on the idea that Hamas leaders had too much to lose, thus increasing their pragmatism. This model appeared validated by events, including Hamas's non-involvement in conflicts with Islamic Jihad in 2022 and May 2023.
Drawing on psychological principles, Margalit explains that the human brain uses past experiences to interpret new data, reinforcing existing models through confirmation bias. Information contradicting established beliefs is either rejected or rationalized to fit the existing worldview. Social psychologist Ziva Kunda's research, she notes, demonstrated decades ago that motivation heavily influences information assessment, with people requiring less evidence for desired conclusions and more for challenging ones.
For Netanyahu, this concept was not just intelligence but a policy he had championed. Acknowledging the warning would have meant admitting the failure of his long-standing approach. Margalit concludes that, similar to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, the problem in 2023 was not a lack of signals but an inability to penetrate the "armor" of entrenched perceptions. She suggests future investigative commissions should examine not only the timeline of information but also the psychological challenge of ensuring leaders can overcome past experiences when reality changes.
