Netanyahu’s Contradiction, and the Warnings Ignored Before October 7

In a long political critique, the article argues that Benjamin Netanyahu presents himself as a new David Ben-Gurion while doing the opposite of what Israel’s founder did. It opens with Netanyahu’s rare meeting in Shlomi, held about two weeks earlier at 1:30 p.m. with heads of border-adjacent councils and several ministers, where he praised Ben-Gurion but then claimed the former premier could not say no to the United States or other powers. Netanyahu used the 1956 Sinai campaign as an example and insisted, “I will not cave in. We are operating in all arenas and we will not cave.” Israeli officials present responded by saying Israel was acting in all of Lebanon, including Beirut and the Bekaa, though the article says reality soon showed otherwise, with a ceasefire, restrictions on strikes, and American approval required for every move.

The article then shifts to what it calls Netanyahu’s damage to Israel’s strategic position. It says his 2015 campaign against Barack Obama’s Iran nuclear deal, including his speech to Congress, badly harmed relations with Democrats. Later, it says, he persuaded Donald Trump to leave the agreement, helping Iran accelerate its nuclear program toward enough material for 11 bombs. After the recent war with Iran, the article says the regime survived and Israel’s alliance with the United States was weakened, while the world now despises Israel and Arab partners fear open cooperation.

A central section argues that Yair Lapid and the security establishment were misled, but that Avigdor Liberman alone saw the danger in Gaza. The article cites a secret 11-page December 2016 memo warning of a Hamas invasion, hostage-taking, and massacre if Israel did not launch a major operation. It also details Liberman’s confrontations in 2016 and 2017 with IDF and Shin Bet officials, where he pushed for a decisive strike on Hamas, warned about 2021 political limits, and said Hamas leaders Yahya Sinwar and Muhammad Deif viewed the destruction of Israel as strategic. The generals, including Gadi Eisenkot and Herzi Halevi, argued that a preventive war made no strategic sense, while Liberman said delaying would only worsen the threat.

The article says Liberman finally resigned as defense minister on 14 November 2018 after Netanyahu chose de-escalation and sent Yossi Cohen to Qatar to bring cash to Hamas instead of authorizing a strike. It also revisits Eisenkot’s focus on Hezbollah’s cross-border tunnel threat, the later “Mabul Al-Aqsa” planning in Gaza, and the missed chance to destroy Hamas’s underground network. The final sections note that the author sees Netanyahu as the opposite of Ben-Gurion, praises Liberman for consistency on Gaza and Iran, and raises concerns about the new Mossad chief, Roman Gofman, who has formed a five-person “council of sages,” launched his own October 7 inquiry, and is considering new mission priorities. The piece ends by saying the appointment was a risky gamble and hoping it succeeds.