Netanyahu Seen as Leading Candidate Despite Responsibility for October 7 Failure
The responsibility of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for the October 7 security failure is undisputed, but the question of leadership extends beyond blame alone. Those seeking to replace him must demonstrate a superior security vision and explain their own roles in the failed strategic approach that collapsed on that date. Calls for Netanyahu's replacement are frequent and legitimate, yet many challengers, including Benny Gantz, Naftali Bennett, Yair Lapid, and others, have been integral to Israel's political and security establishment over the past 25 years. They helped shape a strategic concept focused on managing rather than resolving the conflict, relying on deterrence, containment, limited military engagements, economic improvements for Palestinians, and temporary arrangements to maintain stability without fundamentally changing the security reality.
While some tools within this approach were effective, the problem arose when these means became an end in themselves, substituting for decisive resolution. This concept collapsed on October 7. Therefore, challengers must clarify their past involvement in this strategy and how their approach has changed. Avigdor Lieberman stands out among Netanyahu's opponents for consistently opposing the policy of containment and advocating for the elimination of Hamas leadership, including Yahya Sinwar and Ismail Haniyeh, arguing that Israel cannot accept a terror regime in Gaza.
Netanyahu, despite bearing primary responsibility for the failure, has undergone a significant shift since October 7. Under his leadership, Israel has adopted a more aggressive policy against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran, expanding the Israel Defense Forces' operational freedom and making bolder strategic decisions. This change reflects a break from the old concept and a willingness to act differently in the new reality. The paradox is that the leader responsible for the failure also appears to have moved away from the failed strategy more than his rivals.
The author argues that Netanyahu remains the leading candidate to form the next government, as he currently offers the most convincing combination of experience, responsibility, and strategic awakening. The core issue is not only who leads but whether Israel has truly changed the strategic concept that led to the October 7 disaster or is merely replacing personnel while maintaining the same flawed worldview. The author calls on Lieberman to consider cooperation with Netanyahu after the elections, suggesting that a partnership between a leader who has awakened to new realities and one who consistently warned against the old approach could better serve Israel than a united opposition that has yet to reassess its political and security assumptions.
