Lebanon Deal Could Leave Israel Facing Three Costly Options

A Hebrew-language opinion piece argues that a new U.S.-led understanding on Lebanon, negotiated with Iran in Switzerland, puts Israel in a difficult position. The arrangement reportedly includes a mechanism to prevent friction in Lebanon, with Qatar and Pakistan participating but Israel excluded. The authors, former Military Intelligence chief Amos Yadlin and strategist Udi Avnital, say the deal, together with earlier U.S.-Iran understandings, allows Iran to deepen its foothold in Lebanon and constrains Israel’s freedom of action against Hezbollah.

They say Washington has recently pressed Israel to limit attacks in Beirut’s Dahiya district and elsewhere in Lebanon, even though Israel has not been asked to accept similar restraints regarding Gulf states that were also hit by Iran. In their view, this creates a dangerous linkage between the Iran talks and the Lebanese front, while also affecting other arenas such as Gaza and Judea and Samaria. Israel, they write, cannot accept outside dictates on its right to defend itself and now faces three unattractive choices.

The first option is continued military pressure on Hezbollah, which they say would likely trigger direct friction with President Donald Trump’s administration, accusations that Israel sabotaged the U.S.-Iran talks, and possible loss of American backing if fighting with Iran resumes. They reject the idea that occupying territory up to the Litani River or creating a narrow buffer zone would solve the problem, saying it would revive guerrilla warfare and strain a military already exhausted after 2.5 years of war and stretched across Gaza, Syria and the West Bank.

The second option is to keep the current limited pattern of action, mixing force with pauses under U.S. pressure. They warn this could produce the worst of both worlds, ongoing tension with Washington, a prolonged guerrilla campaign that could bolster Hezbollah’s image, and reduced focus on Iran’s nuclear issue. Their preferred third option is a combined diplomatic and military approach: speed up talks with the Lebanese government in Washington, pursue a phased Israeli withdrawal from areas that are demilitarized and put under effective Lebanese Army control, and tie any aid to the Lebanese Army to severing its links with Hezbollah. Such an agreement, they argue, should be backed by the international system and U.S. guarantees, make Hezbollah disarmament the condition for any broader accord, and preserve Israel’s right to act if Hezbollah returns to vacated areas. They conclude that direct diplomacy with Beirut is the best way to separate Lebanon from Iran and refocus the U.S.-Iran negotiations on the nuclear file.