Jewish Settlement's Shift From National Project to Political Tool

Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel, a cornerstone of Zionist nation-building from its inception, has transformed from a unifying national endeavor into a politically charged issue, primarily associated with one camp. Initially, settlements like kibbutzim, moshavim, and frontier villages were integral to the Zionist movement's strategy of turning ideology into reality, embodying a national vision where settling, cultivating, defending, and developing the land were synonymous with building the state. This was particularly true for the labor Zionist movements, which viewed settlement as a national mission intertwining agriculture, settlement, and security, famously encapsulated by the phrase "the last plow furrow is the border."

Even during periods of conflict, such as the establishment of "Wall and Tower" settlements, the purpose extended beyond mere habitation to asserting land control, agricultural development, Jewish presence, and defense. Post-statehood, settlement continued to be a vital tool for state construction, absorbing immigration, developing peripheral areas, and reinforcing borders, with rural and urban settlements designed to populate sparsely inhabited regions and establish territorial contiguity and resource development. Frontier settlements, in particular, served a clear security function by providing a constant civilian presence where the state sought to establish a foothold, integrating land reclamation, development, and defense into a single national enterprise.

The Six-Day War in 1967 marked a significant turning point, expanding Israel's controlled territory and posing new questions about how to manage these areas and their populations. While differing perspectives emerged within the government and the Labor movement, including those of Yigal Allon, Israel Galili, and Moshe Dayan, settlement remained a key component in strategic thinking regarding security, demographics, and territorial control. For instance, the Allon Plan proposed establishing Israeli footholds in the Jordan Valley and the central mountain range through Jewish settlement as part of a security border concept, and the "Galili Document" in 1973 outlined further settlement plans for the Golan Heights and Jordan Valley. Early settlements in these areas, like Marom Golan (established July 1967) and Ein Gev (established 1968), were initiated by members of kibbutzim in coordination with settlement movements, continuing the tradition of labor settlement rather than originating from a specific political faction.

However, a different process unfolded in Judea and Samaria. While initial settlement attempts involved various groups, including the "Shechem" group (1969-1973), the center of gravity for Jewish settlement in the region shifted towards Gush Emunim and the religious Zionist movement after the Yom Kippur War, particularly between 1973 and 1974. Gush Emunim, documented as a religious-national movement formed post-Yom Kippur War, aimed to renew settlement in Judea and Samaria, Gaza, and the Golan. This shift marked a significant change: the settlers' political identity evolved, and what was once a central tool of labor Zionism became increasingly identified with religious Zionism, with "building the land" being reframed as the "settlement enterprise."

This rebranding carried substantial implications. When a new political group adopted an established national project and imbued it with new ideological meaning, public perception changed. Gush Emunim did not invent settlement but adopted, deepened, and infused it with religious-national and historical significance. Concurrently, settlement in Judea and Samaria transitioned from a potential government policy to a subject of political struggle. A pivotal moment occurred in July 1974, following a Gush Emunim settlement attempt in Sebastia, when the government debated its confrontation with the movement and the legitimacy of non-governmental entities dictating policy. This marked the beginning of a debate extending beyond the traditional left-right political divide, questioning how a tool of Zionism that shaped presence, developed regions, built borders, and established a state became predominantly identified with a single political camp. The article poses whether the settlement itself changed, or its political meaning, and whether the religious Zionist movement's adoption of settlement in Judea and Samaria made it a sectoral project or a continuation of an old Zionist tradition in a new context. It also questions if other segments of the Zionist movement began to reject settlement not due to a change in the idea itself, but because the people championing it were no longer those they identified with.

The author suggests that these questions are not inherently political and that distance from political debate can offer clarity. Settlement predates the current political divisions, Gush Emunim, the dispute over Judea and Samaria, and the modern left-right definitions. For decades, it served as a primary instrument through which Zionism built the national home. Therefore, the core question may not be about where to settle, but what happened to the national value of settlement itself. The article concludes by asking if a project that was once a shared national value can become a political weapon without fundamentally altering the concept of Zionism itself, and if settlement, as a means by which the Zionist idea became a state, prompts a re-examination not just of settlement locations, but of the national value of settlement itself.