US Gains Control of Strait of Hormuz Amid Tensions with Iran and China

Seven months after the start of the war against Iran, reports indicate that oil flow through the Strait of Hormuz has returned to approximately 80 percent of pre-war levels. This achievement, facilitated by a U.S. Navy blockade, continuous escort of vessels in the Persian Gulf, and the use of bypass pipelines, has helped restore America's standing in the Gulf, while Iran has failed to resume its oil exports through the strait. The military success was attributed to a massive and sustained American presence, including nearly a third of the U.S. Navy's destroyers and the prolonged deployment of the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln for nearly a year. This extensive effort has also caused friction within the Pentagon due to concerns about depleting advanced munitions and diverting resources from other theaters.

The redeployment of the aircraft carrier USS George Washington from the Pacific to the Middle East highlights the tension between maintaining a significant presence in the Gulf and the U.S. commitment to balancing power against China in the Indo-Pacific region. A summit between Trump and Xi Jinping in late September underscored China's position as the U.S.'s primary strategic competitor. While the summit's statements emphasized Iran's return to negotiations and the need to prevent nuclear proliferation, they did not signal a fundamental shift in Beijing's policy toward Tehran. China continues its economic ties and trade with Iran, thereby diminishing the effectiveness of U.S. pressure.

Furthermore, there are reports of Chinese assistance to Iran in intelligence and military technology, including satellite imagery data and electronic components for drones and missiles. Such aid could bolster Iran's operational capabilities, even as Beijing publicly supports regional stability and diplomatic solutions. From Beijing's perspective, diverting U.S. attention and resources to the Middle East could serve its strategic interests, particularly given the rivalry in the Indo-Pacific. This creates a dual dilemma for Washington: the longer the conflict in the Middle East persists, the more forces and resources are required, precisely when China remains the U.S.'s main strategic challenge.

This dynamic influences the central policy question: under what conditions will the U.S. be willing to end the Gulf crisis? As the conflict continues, Washington must balance leveraging its military superiority for significant concessions from Iran against avoiding prolonged involvement that diverts resources from competition with China. Against this backdrop, Iran has proposed reopening the Strait of Hormuz and resuming nuclear talks in exchange for lifting the naval blockade, easing sanctions, and unfreezing assets, though Tehran is currently unwilling to make substantial concessions on uranium enrichment.

Trump stated that a year ago he would have accepted Iran's proposed deal, but the U.S. now believes its advantage in the Strait of Hormuz allows for increased pressure. Conversely, Iran believes its regime can survive the economic hardship and U.S. pressure, leading to a stalemate where both sides hope the other will break first. U.S. control of the strait does not guarantee Iran's capitulation; increased pressure could lead the regime, viewing itself in an existential struggle, to escalate the conflict to Gulf states and targets worldwide. The attempt to strike a British air base in Fairford, also used by the U.S., illustrates the risk of escalating the conflict beyond the Middle East.

The core question is whether military and economic pressure will ultimately lead to a long-term change in Iran's behavior. If U.S. pressure succeeds in achieving this, particularly if Tehran agrees to freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and IAEA oversight of its nuclear program, it would represent a significant strategic shift. However, there is no certainty of this outcome; pressure could instead lead to Iranian insistence on preserving its nuclear program and ballistic missile capabilities. Such defiance might increase the likelihood of Trump opting for kinetic actions to break the deadlock. An underlying strategic question is whether the Trump administration is prepared to sustain its Middle East force deployment levels given U.S. military commitments elsewhere, especially in the Indo-Pacific. Without a political settlement or a significant change in Iran's behavior, a return to conflict after the midterm elections remains a possibility. For Trump, the challenge will be translating the Hormuz achievement into an end to the war, whether through a political settlement, continued pressure, or renewed military action.