Israel Faces Ongoing Aviation Security Gaps Despite Warnings

A persistent failure in vetting foreign flight crews by Israel's Ministry of Transport's security department affects not only foreign airlines flying to Israel but also aircraft chartered by Israeli carriers. A May 2024 State Comptroller report, largely classified for security reasons, highlighted aviation security gaps and recommended a reassessment of inter-agency responsibilities. Despite these warnings, the issue remains unresolved, leaving passengers vulnerable as responsibility for vetting foreign crews falls between government bodies.

The current tense security situation has increased demand for Israeli flights. As foreign airlines reduce or cease operations to Israel, El Al, Arkia, and Israir face passenger volumes exceeding their own fleet capacities. To compensate, they utilize "wet leases" and "code-sharing" agreements, solutions also employed during peak seasons and holidays. In a wet lease, an Israeli airline sells tickets and operates flights under its own brand but leases aircraft along with their crews and safety personnel from a foreign company. Passengers book with an Israeli airline, but foreign nationals operate the aircraft.

In code-sharing, an Israeli airline sells seats on a flight operated by another company, allowing passengers to book and pay through the Israeli carrier but fly on a foreign aircraft. Israeli airlines do not conduct their own security background checks on foreign pilots due to a lack of authority and access to necessary information. Responsibility lies with the state, where a long-standing dispute over jurisdiction persists among the relevant agencies.

A March 6, 2025, National Security Council (NSC) document noted that, unlike other countries, Israel lacks a single body responsible for aviation security. The NSC stated that a historical division exists between the Shin Bet and the Ministry of Transport, with the Shin Bet guiding Israeli companies and the Ministry of Transport handling foreign flights. This division creates problems for leased flights, where the ticketing airline is Israeli but the aircraft and crew are foreign. The Comptroller's report identified a gap in leased flight security after the Shin Bet relinquished responsibility, a situation the NSC document attributed to a July 2021 cabinet decision. The Ministry of Transport, according to the document, has not acted on a subsequent decision requiring the Civil Aviation Authority to verify that foreign countries' security directives meet international standards.

The State Comptroller's investigation, conducted between April 2022 and June 2023, examined outbound flights from Israel, Israeli flights abroad, and the security of foreign civilian and private aircraft entering Israeli airspace. The investigation involved the Shin Bet, Ministry of Transport, Israel Airports Authority, and the NSC, with supplementary inquiries at the Mossad, Civil Aviation Authority, and other security bodies. The subcommittee of the State Control Committee decided not to publish the full chapter due to national security concerns. The published portion recommended the NSC convene a task force with the Ministry of Transport, Ministry of Finance, Israel Airports Authority, Shin Bet, and police to examine all aspects of aviation security, including foreign aviation entering Israel. It also advised reconsidering government and cabinet decisions in this area and clarifying responsibilities for a comprehensive approach.

Following the criticism, a task force led by the NSC, including the Ministry of Transport, Civil Aviation Authority, Shin Bet, Mossad, and Ministry of Finance, was established. The task force recommended that the Ministry of Transport assume responsibility for these flights, with the Civil Aviation Authority handling the internal management within the ministry. The NSC explained that the Civil Aviation Authority liaises with foreign aviation authorities, represents Israel in aviation agreements with security clauses, and conducts checks at airports. However, as of March 2025, nearly four years after the Shin Bet ceased handling leased flights, the Ministry of Transport had yet to implement the decision intended to regulate their oversight.

The Ministry of Transport stated that "various elements are disseminating fake news and lies and intentionally misleading." They rejected claims based on confusion between foreign and leased flights operated by Israeli companies, asserting that the leaked document pertains only to leased flights and that responsibility for foreign flights has never been transferred. The Ministry has been responsible for security arrangements for inbound foreign aviation for decades. Until 2021, all leased flights were secured by the Shin Bet. Following a 2021 cabinet decision to focus Shin Bet security on high-risk leased flights, a gap emerged for other leased flights, which the Comptroller highlighted. The Ministry agreed to assume responsibility for non-Shin Bet secured leased flights starting in 2026, contingent on budget and staffing allocations, clarifying that this does not involve foreign flights. They emphasized that professional discussions focused on the scope of the task and the need for authority, personnel, budget, and security assistance, as the Ministry is not an intelligence body. The Ministry also noted that its security wing's procedures are approved by the NSC and security agencies and are based on threat assessments. They have secured dedicated funding for computer systems and leased flights to address gaps and enhance oversight. The Ministry supports the establishment of a state authority for aviation security but stated that implementing such a body requires a government decision. Regarding a Flydubai incident, the Ministry stated the airline received explicit instructions, committed to required background checks, and confirmed implementing nationality restrictions in its crew scheduling system. The Ministry did not receive the crew list for flight FZ1073 and lacks access to flight lists, adding that the circumstances of the incident are under investigation by security agencies.

Arkia responded that it regularly operates leased flights with foreign crews who stay in Israel for extended periods. A condition for Arkia is that crews must be from countries with relations with Israel, and crews undergo security checks according to Arkia's requirements. Foreign companies they work with adhere to security plans, including background checks for aircrews and maintenance personnel, and undergo IATA IOSA audits. Arkia stated that the claim of leasing aircraft and crews without vetting is inaccurate, as all leased flights operate under Arkia's Israeli framework and stringent security requirements.

Israir stated that passenger safety and security are paramount and that the company operates in accordance with law, security directives, and regulatory requirements. Operating leased aircraft is part of a risk management policy approved by the Prime Minister, balancing the limitations of Israeli aviation security with the need for regular flights. Foreign airlines operating in Israel undergo vetting by the Civil Aviation Authority and the Ministry of Transport. Israir exclusively contracts with companies employing European aircrews after assessing their financial stability. Foreign crews entering Israel undergo border control and other checks by authorized bodies. Israir clarified that while they do not directly perform background checks, this does not mean crews are not vetted, and the presentation of Israeli airlines "selling security" without providing it is inaccurate.