Flydubai Incident Exposes Deep Flaws in Israel's Aviation Security
Translated & summarized from N12 by baba
The story in 5 lines · by baba
- Flydubai flight incident reveals two deep structural problems in Israeli aviation security.
- Ministry of Transport's role in air terror prevention is deemed disproportionate and unsuitable.
- Unique organizational structure for Israeli airline security is a global anomaly.
- Expert calls for urgent review and improvement of operational responses.
- Reliance on luck is not a viable long-term security strategy.
A recent incident involving a Flydubai flight en route to Israel, which concluded without harm, has highlighted two significant structural problems in the nation's aviation security framework. According to Dani Shenar, former head of the Security, Emergency, and Cyber Department at the Ministry of Transport and a senior aviation security expert, these issues can no longer be ignored.
The first major concern is the Ministry of Transport's central yet ill-suited role in preventing aerial terrorism, particularly concerning foreign airlines flying to Israel. Despite its crucial function in national infrastructure, the ministry was legislated to hold overall responsibility for air terror prevention. This responsibility, which began to be addressed with reforms in 2003 following the 9/11 attacks, primarily focuses on foreign carriers. While the ministry's security department has performed competently, Shenar suggests the burden placed upon it is disproportionate, as its role is intended to be regulatory rather than operational, and it lacks a designated professional "guide" as defined by law.
The second issue lies within the organizational structure of Israel's aviation security system. For decades, the Shin Bet has provided professional security guidance to all Israeli airlines through El Al's security department, now known as "Ofek." This arrangement, where Arkia and Israir receive security services from a company affiliated with or identified with El Al, a business competitor, is unique globally. This structure was imposed as a necessity in the early 1970s due to a wave of attacks on Israeli aviation.
Shenar argues that sensitive government security operations abroad should be conducted by a state entity. While efforts have been made to have security operations handled by "Ofek," which operates in connection with the publicly-private El Al, the security of foreign flights carrying many Israelis to Israel remains a concern. These flights, though attractive targets, do not receive the same level of security as Israeli carriers. However, he notes that advanced technological screening at most international airports mitigates this gap to some extent.
An earlier proposal in 2011 to establish a state authority for aviation security under the Ministry of Transport was rejected. Shenar concludes that these critical issues, along with other tactical problems revealed by the incident, require immediate attention to improve operational responses, emphasizing that relying on luck is not a sustainable security strategy.
Read the original at N12