Morocco's 2026 Elections: Party Competition and Political Participation Challenges

Morocco held its fourth legislative elections since the 2011 constitutional reforms on September 23, 2026. These elections followed protests by the "Generation Z" movement, which highlighted widespread youth discontent fueled by economic hardship and a 27% unemployment rate among those aged 15-24. The protests, which began on social media and moved to the streets, focused on social justice, the rising cost of living, and corruption, with sharp criticism directed at Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch and his government.

Escalating tensions were evident in late July 2026 when thousands of young Moroccans attempted to cross into Spanish-controlled Ceuta, an event seen by some as an expression of "loss of hope in a decent life." Accusations of conflict of interest, particularly concerning fuel prices and the Prime Minister's personal gains as owner of a major fuel company, intensified. These issues deepened political polarization, with supporters of the Prime Minister accusing opposition parties, notably the Justice and Development Party (PJD) led by former Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane, of demonizing opponents. Even allied parties, the Istiqlal Party and the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), began distancing themselves from Akhannouch's National Rally of Independents (RNI) party.

The election campaign was marked by sharp polarization around the Prime Minister, exacerbated by widely shared past statements attributed to him. The RNI struggled to promote its claimed achievements in fiscal balance, economic growth, and healthcare expansion. The political landscape shifted further with Fouzi Lekjaa, president of the Royal Moroccan Football Federation and former budget minister, joining the PAM, a party considered close to the monarchy and founded by King Mohammed VI's advisor Fouad Ali El Himma. Lekjaa's popularity and royal confidence made his move a significant gain for PAM.

The election results saw the PAM secure the first position with 97 seats, followed by the RNI with 66 seats, and the Istiqlal Party with 65 seats. The PJD, the main opposition party, significantly increased its seats to 54. The article suggests that the normalization of relations between Morocco and Israel, formalized shortly before the elections, may have mobilized some social bases of the PJD. Despite Benkirane's return as leader, the PJD struggled to expand its base beyond its traditional Islamist-leaning electorate.

Turnout was 39%, one of the lowest since 2007, with particularly low participation among youth aged 18-24, representing only 4% of registered voters. This low engagement, especially in urban areas, underscores a continuing trust deficit between the public and political parties. Rural areas showed higher participation rates (45%) compared to cities (37%), with parties closer to the ruling establishment, like PAM and RNI, performing better in the countryside.

According to the 2011 constitution, the King appoints the Prime Minister from the party that wins the most seats. Based on the results, the new Prime Minister must come from PAM. King Mohammed VI appointed Fatima Ezzahra Mansouri, a prominent figure in PAM and the first woman to hold the position, as Prime Minister. PAM will need to form a coalition with at least two other parties to secure a majority, with a renewed alliance with the RNI and Istiqlal Party being the most likely scenario. The PJD has officially stated its intention to remain in opposition.