Netanyahu's Defense on Oct. 7 Under Scrutiny Amidst Prior Warnings

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's primary defense following the October 7th Hamas attacks centers on the claim that he was not adequately warned, attributing the intelligence failure to the military and Shin Bet's misjudgment of Hamas's intentions. However, a review of events leading up to the attack suggests a more complex picture, raising questions about how many signals leadership requires before reassessing its understanding of threats.

Evidence indicates that Netanyahu was informed of potential large-scale Hamas incursions and hostage-taking scenarios years prior. In December 2016, then-Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman reportedly provided Netanyahu with an 11-page document detailing a prophetic scenario of Hamas units breaching the border, capturing Israeli towns, and taking hostages, warning against a policy of appeasement. In April 2018, another intelligence assessment described a major Hamas offensive plan involving thousands of militants. Netanyahu maintains he was not presented with the specific "Jericho Wall" plan before the war.

Further warnings emerged in the months preceding October 7th. In the spring of 2023, military intelligence assessments indicated a rising probability of war, which Netanyahu publicly described as "exaggerated" while acknowledging Israel's preparations. Between March and July 2023, the Prime Minister's Office reportedly received four documents from the IDF detailing a deteriorating strategic situation and adversaries perceiving Israel's internal crisis as an opportunity for attack.

In September 2023, during indirect negotiations with Hamas regarding the return of Israeli captives, Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar reportedly "disappeared from the radar," a significant behavioral shift that, according to the author's operational experience, should have prompted a reevaluation of assumptions. Sinwar later conveyed a message about an approaching "earthquake" and a "big surprise," which was interpreted by Israeli systems as mere negotiation tactics.

Additionally, foreign intelligence agencies reportedly issued warnings. The Wall Street Journal reported that Egypt's then-head of intelligence, Abbas Kamel, repeatedly warned Israel of growing threats from Gaza, including an urgent visit on September 26th and a personal call to Netanyahu days before the attack. The Prime Minister's Office denies both the call and the warning. Reports also suggest that UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed warned Netanyahu about Sinwar preparing a major operation about ten days before the attack, a claim also denied by the Prime Minister's Office.

The article highlights Netanyahu's rejection of a state commission of inquiry, citing concerns about the appointment mechanism's public trust. While an alternative proposal for a state-national commission was introduced, its legislative process has been slow, leading the author to conclude that a thorough investigation is not a priority for Netanyahu. The author posits two main possibilities: either critical information did not reach the Prime Minister, indicating a systemic failure in national security management, or the information was received but not acted upon, pointing to flaws in analysis and decision-making. If Netanyahu received the warnings but denies it, it raises questions about his truthfulness to the public.