Israeli Officers Claimed Knowledge of Nasrallah's Location, Habits

Two Israeli intelligence officers, one from military intelligence (Aman) and another from the Air Force, claimed that Israel possessed intimate knowledge of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah's whereabouts, movements, habits, preferred foods, sleep schedule, and companions. The Air Force officer, responsible for assassination operations, stated that Nasrallah was located in a large, underground facility prior to October 7, which was targeted with 83 bombs due to its challenging subterranean nature. He asserted that Nasrallah felt secure on October 8, believing Israel's focus was solely on Gaza, and acted relatively normally, maintaining secrecy but not in a full wartime posture. The officer noted Nasrallah's deep involvement in all aspects of Hezbollah's operations, from strategic assessments to decisions on resource allocation for elite forces and missile development.

Following the "Beirut port explosion" incident, the officer explained, Hezbollah realized they had lost control, leading to a weakening of their communication systems and personnel. He added that Nasrallah struggled to grasp the full scope of events and underestimated Israel's resolve, choosing to remain in a known location rather than relocate. This, the officer suggested, stemmed from a miscalculation of the ground situation and a failure to properly analyze the sequence of events, leading him to believe Israel would not pursue the matter to its conclusion.

The Aman officer described "absolute" intelligence control over Nasrallah, with no "blackout windows" regarding his location. He emphasized that the intelligence team felt they were in an optimal position, even concerning potential collateral damage, and advocated strongly to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu for decisive action. The officer recounted the moments before Nasrallah's assassination, expressing high confidence in the operation's success and his only fear being that decision-makers might hesitate or postpone the strike.

Regarding collateral damage, the Aman officer claimed it was less than anticipated, with around 30 non-combatants present during the strike, a number comparable to the Hezbollah operatives killed alongside Nasrallah. He concluded that Hezbollah is significantly diminished without Nasrallah, its capabilities and influence drastically reduced. He also suggested that Nasrallah's successor, Naim Qassem, and Khamenei's son are now vulnerable.