Netanyahu's Response to October 7th Attack Under Scrutiny

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was alerted to the Hamas attack on October 7th, but reports suggest he could have prevented the massacre. According to Channel 12, Netanyahu's actions in the first four hours after being informed are particularly telling. Despite knowing about the mass killings, hostage-taking, and territorial seizures, he allegedly did not take all necessary measures. Warnings about the impending threat had been issued to Netanyahu beforehand, but he reportedly did not heed them. Three months prior to the attack, the Prime Minister himself acknowledged that Israeli authorities were aware of Hamas plans involving hundreds of militants using underground routes to infiltrate communities, abduct civilians and soldiers, carry out killings, and return. Opposition leader Yair Lapid stated two weeks before the attack that heads of major security agencies, including the IDF, Shin Bet, and police, had warned the government of escalating violence risks. Netanyahu's military secretary, Maj. Gen. Avi Gil, woke him at 6:29 AM to report the surprise Hamas assault and rocket fire. Netanyahu woke 27 minutes before the first militant breached the fence of Kibbutz Be'eri, a window during which significant actions could have been taken. Initial reports indicate Netanyahu's first question was about the rocket fire's cause. Journalist Ronen Bergman suggests the Prime Minister initially believed Hamas was not interested in a large-scale attack due to existing agreements on funding and work permits. At 6:40 AM, Gil contacted Netanyahu again, reporting chaos, expected dozens of hostages, and hundreds of casualties. Netanyahu inquired about Hamas's objectives, the possibility of eliminating its leadership, and the need to mobilize reservists, while Shin Bet and IDF chiefs were already assembling response teams. Later, it is alleged that the head of the Prime Minister's office, Tzachi Braverman, attempted to alter transcripts of conversations to conceal the initial call where Netanyahu questioned the rocket attack. Netanyahu himself offered a different account, suggesting he might have been intentionally kept uninformed to avoid provoking an early Israeli response. Bergman claims this approach stemmed from Netanyahu's directives to maintain calm on the Gaza and Judea and Samaria borders, with the primary focus being the advancement of a normalization agreement with Saudi Arabia. The article also notes Netanyahu's view that the current election campaign, focused on potential government dependencies on Arab parties, distracts from discussions about leadership responsibility for the October 7th tragedy.