Netanyahu's October 7th Schedule Raises More Questions Than Answers

New details continue to emerge regarding the events of October 7th, particularly concerning the actions and timelines of Israel's leadership. A significant point of contention is the delay in communication between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then-IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi following the Hamas attack. While Halevi was in the Kirya military headquarters from 7:15 AM, and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant arrived around 7:45 AM, Netanyahu's arrival at the Kirya was recorded at 8:22 AM, according to Shin Bet records released by his office. This raises questions about his activities in the nearly two hours after the attack began and why his first meeting with Halevi and Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar didn't occur until an hour and a half later.

Adding to the scrutiny, Netanyahu has claimed that the security establishment deliberately did not wake him early on October 7th, fearing he might order a preemptive strike. However, the article notes that even hours after the attack commenced, such actions did not materialize. This defense strategy relies on the hypothetical 'what if' scenario, as the article points out that the feared preemptive strike did not occur.

Further complicating the narrative, a review of a security assessment meeting held by Netanyahu on October 1st, six days before the attack, reveals a dual approach to policy. While publicly discussing the opportunity for a historic peace with Saudi Arabia and the need to counter those who would sabotage it, the meeting's summary also included directives to "intensify the use of moves in the area of humanitarian benefits for better and worse to influence Hamas's conduct and policy" and to advance civilian arrangements with Hamas, alongside operational readiness for targeted killings. This contrasts with Netanyahu's later claims of warning against escalation and ordering readiness to eliminate Hamas leadership.

Critics, including those who participated in discussions with the Prime Minister, describe a practice of "talking to the protocol and selective publications." This involves making statements that can be selectively presented to different audiences. The article cites the October 1st meeting summary as an example, where parts calling for arrangements with Hamas and the "accordion" method of economic benefits were omitted from public statements, while the parts about preparing for operational readiness were highlighted. This practice, the article argues, deviates from effective governance and policy-making, which should aim to shape reality rather than leaving all options open.

As Netanyahu seeks another term, the article emphasizes the public's need for answers regarding the events of October 7th and the leadership's response. The Prime Minister himself acknowledged after the war that "we will all have to give answers to difficult questions. This includes me. There was a terrible failure here, and it will be fully investigated." The piece concludes that now is the opportune time to provide these answers.