Iran Appoints Mohsen Rezaei to Top Security Post Amid Internal Power Struggles

Iran has appointed Mohsen Rezaei as the new Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, a key body that shapes the country's foreign and security policies. Rezaei, a veteran commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from 1981 to 1997, assumes this role during a sensitive period marked by escalating tensions with the US and Israel, the collapse of diplomatic understandings with Washington, and internal disagreements within Iran's leadership on how to manage ongoing conflicts and negotiations.

According to analysis by Middle East Online, Rezaei's appointment signals a strengthening of the hardline faction within the Iranian power structure. This move appears to counterbalance the influence of Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, a former IRGC commander who has faced criticism from hardliners for supporting ceasefire talks with the US. Iran expert Hamidreza Azizi interprets the appointment as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei's effort to curb what he views as Ghalibaf's excessive sway, suggesting the hardline camp is gaining the upper hand.

However, security analyst Saeed Gholkar warns that the rivalry between these senior figures, both with political ambitions, could intensify internal competition rather than unify policy direction. The appointment underscores the IRGC's continued centrality in Iran's political and security decision-making.

Separately, the article highlights the United Arab Emirates' plans to build a new liquefied natural gas (LNG) export facility on its eastern coast outside the Strait of Hormuz. This strategic move aims to reduce the UAE's dependence on the Strait, a critical but vulnerable chokepoint for Gulf energy exports, especially after recent attacks on ADNOC vessels. The project, which could cost billions and require new pipelines, would mark a significant shift in regional energy export routes.

Additionally, a Bulgarian international relations expert, Prof. Louis Rene Brass, argues that Israel's longstanding policy of nuclear ambiguity may no longer effectively deter adversaries. He suggests a gradual transition toward "selective nuclear disclosure" to enhance deterrence credibility without fully revealing Israel's nuclear capabilities. Brass emphasizes that Israel's nuclear arsenal should primarily prevent war rather than be used in combat, advocating careful communication to avoid miscalculations or unintended escalation.

These developments reflect shifting dynamics in Middle Eastern security and energy landscapes, with Iran's internal power balance, Gulf states' strategic adjustments, and Israel's deterrence posture all evolving amid regional tensions.