Iran's “Ring of Fire” Around Israel Has Changed, Leaving Tehran in a Crucial Dilemma

For decades in Israel, people had grown used to thinking that Iran’s proxies were meant to act on its behalf, without Tehran paying the price. But the latest round has shown that the reality is different: they are no longer just “defenders,” but assets that now require active protection from Mother Iran. Tehran’s dilemma, the weakening on the Palestinian front, and the proxy that only wanted to tick a box in the war, they did not really deliver the goods.

Yogev Karmel, N12 Magazine Published: 11.06.26, 07:43

The echoes of explosions and interceptions are still ringing in the ears, and this week’s short round of fighting against Iran made clear that something profound has changed in the Middle East. When Iran acts directly against Israel in order to protect weakened Hezbollah, it seems that the balance of power has shifted. “Iran had an interest in acting to show, ‘We keep our promises,’” Dr. Abd Kana'aneh explains the Iranian response, which led to nearly a full day of fighting. “Their message is, ‘Unlike others, we intervene, and when necessary we support our allies.’”

The dust from this very short round of fighting has not yet settled, but the strategic debate in Israel is already underway, against the backdrop of a new reality. For decades, we were used to the idea that Iran was building a “ring of fire” around Israel of outposts, proxies, whose purpose was to bleed Israel without Tehran paying the direct price. But this week, after the targeted strike in the Dahieh, a different scene was seen, Iran was the one that rushed to defend its proxy.

Kana'aneh, a lecturer and researcher in the Department of Middle East and Africa History at Tel Aviv University, argues: “The old paradigm was not accurate to begin with. It is simply convenient for Israel, and for the Western world, to deal with Iran and its allies in the region, the easiest thing is to say, ‘It’s just a proxy, and if we strike the head, all the limbs will fall one after the other.’”

Iran is the one that rushed to defend its proxy, unlike what we were used to thinking. Mojtaba Khamenei | Photo: Reuters

By resuming launches after two months, he says, “The Iranians are telling the Lebanese and sending a message to the entire Islamic world: ‘Unlike others, we keep our promises, and we do not abandon our allies in different regions. We are not like the United States, which abandoned its allies, for example in Egypt with Hosni Mubarak, or could not protect the Gulf states.’”

He also does not rule out the possibility that Iran will continue to respond on behalf of its other proxies, for example the Houthis in Yemen or even Hamas in Gaza. “If something does not work out or somehow blows up, then maybe it will intervene in the Strip too, but it needs the backing or support of other countries in the region, mainly Turkey and Egypt and perhaps Saudi Arabia.”

As it is still unclear whether an agreement will be reached or the exchange of blows will continue, Kana'aneh assesses that the ties between Tehran and its proxies, בראשם the Lebanese terrorist organization, will tighten. “To a large extent, these alliances have דווקא proven themselves, contrary to what some experts say. They showed that this investment over many years was profitable, both for Iran and for the proxies, its allies. I do not know whether this tightening will lead to the Iranians becoming much more dominant in the local arenas of the other forces, meaning in Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq or Gaza. But continued cooperation? Clearly that will continue.”

Will the ties with the proxies tighten? “To a large extent, these alliances have דווקא proven themselves.” Dr. Abd Kana'aneh

The struggle that became a global proxy arms race

But to understand how we got to a situation in which Iran rushes to defend after a strike in an entirely different country, while it itself is in an international crisis around the Strait of Hormuz, we need to go back, to the roots of the doctrine and to the deepest rivalry in the Middle East.

“The proxies are a doctrine that Qassem Soleimani gave the name ‘Halqat al-Nar,’ ‘the ring of fire,’” explains Dr. Shaul Yanai of the School of Political Science at the University of Haifa and a research fellow at the Regional Thinking Forum. “People get confused and think the target is Israel. But the truth is that it is directed against Saudi Arabia, we are only the byproduct.”

During a move for Hezbollah, Iran sends a message, “Unlike others, we keep our promises” | Photo: AP

According to Yanai, it all begins with the Islamic Revolution of 1979. “When Khomeini set the export of the revolution as a supreme goal in 1979, he put Saudi Arabia at the top of his concerns. It is the perfect and complementary opposite of Iran, it is a militant, Islamic, Sunni, fundamentalist theocracy, the mirror image of Iran. The Shiites have a blood feud with them going back to the 18th century, when the Saudi Wahhabis decided to reshape Islam and intended to uproot Shiite Islam, which they regard as heresy, from Islam.”

This conflict, which began in theology, turned into a global proxy arms race. “Both sides invested imaginary sums in trying to turn their religious doctrine into the leading one in the Muslim world,” Yanai says. “Since then, the two have been fighting over dominance and hegemony in the Middle East, politically, religiously and economically. That is the basis for the establishment of all the proxies. But they failed, because to their surprise this theology was not accepted by the Arab Shiites. Since Khomeini’s revolution was also religious, but also political, it changed the basic assumptions of Shiism from top to bottom. And therefore the Arab Shiites did not accept it, and even today do not accept Khomeini’s doctrine. Only after they failed in theological export did they turn to establishing terrorist organizations, the proxies, in each of the countries with a Shiite minority.”

Yanai: “Hezbollah was on the ropes, and Israel saved it.” Dr. Shaul Yanai | Photo: screenshot

For years, he explains, Israel was seen in Tehran as a more secondary arena, but at the same time Iranian concern over the emerging Saudi-Israeli alliance grew stronger. “The rather open alliance between Saudi Arabia and Israel meant that Saudi Arabia focused on the eastern and southern fronts, while Israel focused on the northern front, Syria and Lebanon, in order to stop or contain the Iranian proxies, Hezbollah and Syria. Israel was actually very active over the past decade. And Iran, in response, strengthened its ties even further with Hamas, Islamic Jihad, Hezbollah and the Houthis, arming and financing them massively and at an accelerated pace, even more than before the outbreak of the Cold War between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In other words, the pieces were already on the board before October 7.”

So what changed on October 7? “Let’s go to October 2. There is a fascinating document by Yahya Sinwar that is addressed to both Khamenei and Nasrallah and says to them: ‘Look, the Israeli-Saudi normalization that is supposed to be signed on January 1, 2024 changes the entire balance of the Middle East. Because an Israeli-Saudi alliance will also sideline everything we have built in the Middle East,’ in addition to pushing the Palestinian issue completely out of the game. This was the peak of Sinwar’s attempt to convince both of them, Hezbollah and Iran, to launch a joint attack against Israel before normalization with Saudi Arabia matures. He understands that once the agreement is signed, it is over for him. Therefore, in his view, there must be a joint preemptive strike, which, if successful, and he is right about this, would mean that ‘we changed the equation.’ Even if it does not succeed, it will entangle Israel in war and prevent normalization with Saudi Arabia and with many other Muslim and Arab states that Saudi Arabia would bring as a dowry to the agreement.”

“Sinwar went ahead with October 7 against Iran’s wishes, and Iran paid a heavy price for it.” Sinwar together with Ali Khamenei | Photo: Reuters, Reuters

But the Iranian response was not what Sinwar had hoped for. “Iran and Hezbollah refused Sinwar’s pleas, they told him, ‘This is not the time, this is not the place,’” Yanai notes. “Exactly then Saudi Arabia and Iran had reached some kind of détente between them, a pause in this Cold War, and Hezbollah was very busy with the internal Lebanese arena, especially after many years of war in Syria, a war in which Saudi Arabia sent tens of thousands of volunteers and invested tens of billions to topple Assad’s regime. So Hezbollah was tired, and Iran was economically and internally exhausted, and therefore they refused.”

“Sinwar went ahead with October 7 against Iran’s wishes, and Iran paid a heavy price for it,” he stresses. “Hezbollah was prepared to carry out a limited attack on October 8, but Israel’s weak response encouraged it to continue. The evacuation of Israeli civilians encouraged it even more to continue, until the pager explosions operation.”

He called Iran’s proxies “Halqat al-Nar,” the “ring of fire.” Left, Qassem Soleimani | Photo: Reuters, Reuters

The recent events, especially the fighting on June 7 and 8, raise hard questions about Hezbollah’s current role. If once the organization was seen as Iran’s “insurance policy” against an Israeli strike, it seems that at least this time the situation was reversed. “Hezbollah was on the ropes, and Israel saved it,” Yanai says. “Hezbollah was dealing with enormous losses of fighters and resources, and with enormous internal Lebanese pressure. Above all, it has between 100,000 and 300,000 Shiite refugees that it has to support on a daily basis. The Israeli attack was a mistake, because Hezbollah is now saying: ‘See, I told you I am defending Lebanon.’ It has returned to guerrilla warfare, that is what it specializes in, in territory it knows deeply in southern Lebanon. True, for every Israeli it manages to hit it loses 20 of its own, plus infrastructure, but it is returning to its original base, meaning fairly successful guerrilla warfare against an Israeli ‘occupier’ in its territory, and that is the lifeline that Israel, in its strategic stupidity, handed it.”

“The Revolutionary Guards’ weight in managing Hezbollah is more dramatic than in the past”

However, there are those who see the direct Iranian intervention as evidence of weakness. If Iran is forced to enter the arena itself, it means its players are no longer able to control the field.

Dr. Raz Zimmt, head of the Iran and Shiite Axis program at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), points to a process of “direct management”: “At the most committed and loyal end to Iran, Hezbollah has always been and still is located. Since the campaign between Israel and Hezbollah in the summer-autumn of 2024, against Hezbollah, Iranian involvement has in fact increased very, very sharply. Following the killing of Nasrallah and the senior echelon of Hezbollah’s decision-making process, Iran has taken upon itself not only the traditional role of assistance and support to Hezbollah, including ongoing arms transfers, but the more important thing in my view is that a large part of the day-to-day management of Hezbollah’s rehabilitation has passed into the hands of the Revolutionary Guards.”

“Hundreds of Revolutionary Guards officers have been sent to Lebanon over the past year and a half and have helped in the organization’s day-to-day management. I would not exaggerate and say that the organization is being managed entirely by them, but certainly the weight of the Revolutionary Guards in managing Hezbollah’s affairs and rehabilitation is much more dramatic than it was in the past.”

“The weight of the Revolutionary Guards in managing Hezbollah is more dramatic than in the past.” Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem

Yanai reinforces the point: “We know that Hezbollah’s significant missile units have been managed directly by Revolutionary Guards officers since 2006, since the Second Lebanon War, when Hezbollah went to war without Iranian permission and caused them enormous damage. Hezbollah today is under almost complete Iranian control, especially with Naim Qassem, who is weakened compared with Nasrallah. I am not talking about guerrilla actions in such a village or such a corridor, I am talking about strategic decisions made by Iranian Revolutionary Guards who are sitting in Lebanon.”

The retreat on the Palestinian front

While Iran is tightening its grip in Lebanon, the situation in the rest of the “ring of fire” looks very different. “After Soleimani’s assassination, in January 2020, we saw a kind of decentralization of the proxy network,” Dr. Zimmt explains. “That does not necessarily mean that Iranian influence declined, of course, but that Iran, and especially the Quds Force, lost to some extent their ability to manage this network centrally.” However, he clarifies, “There was never a situation in which Iran gives an order and the proxy carries it out.”

On the Palestinian front, the retreat is clear. “Today it is completely clear that the very limited capabilities of Hamas in the Gaza Strip and Iran’s difficulty in operating both in the Strip and in the West Bank greatly affect Iran’s ability to continue its support. That does not mean there are no ties between what remains of Hamas abroad and the Iranians, but overall we must say that to a large extent the Iranians have lost much of the influence they had in the Palestinian arena.”

In Iraq as well, the state considered Tehran’s strategic key, the Iranian plan is running into difficulties. “Since Iran lost Syria, the most important place left for it in the Arab world is Iraq, but there it faces many problems,” Yanai says. “Muqtada al-Sadr, the prominent Shiite leader in Iraq, dismantled his militia and today is one of Iran’s fiercest opponents in Iraq. And the Iraqi government threatened al-Hashd al-Shaabi and Iran that if they took part in the war against Israel, and they have tens of thousands of missiles, then there would be concern about another civil war in Iraq. A threat that worked well. Therefore we did not find much presence there, despite the fact that this is Iran’s biggest proxy today.”

Dr. Zimmt adds that international pressure is having its effect in Baghdad: “The growing pressures, mainly from the United States and to some extent also from the Iraqi government, to advance a long-term process of disarming the pro-Iranian Shiite militias, this is a process far from over and it is not certain to succeed, but we can see that at least some of the militias that are less identified with the clearly pro-Iranian line have already announced that they are ready to disarm and integrate into the Iraqi armed forces.”

According to him, “the more frequent visits of Quds Force commander Esmail Qaani to Baghdad in recent weeks certainly indicate that the Iranians are very concerned about this process, but that does not mean they intend to give up, not at all.”

Dr. Raz Zimmt: “The Iranians have lost a significant part of the influence they had in the Palestinian arena”

The proxy that “did not deliver the goods”

And perhaps the biggest surprise comes דווקא from Yemen. The Houthis, considered the wildest and most dangerous proxy, remained out of the picture this week except for one launch, apparently just to tick a box.

“The Houthis played a rather minor role throughout the war, despite Iran’s very clear desire for them to join the campaign,” Zimmt says. “In the final analysis, they did not really deliver the goods, and that is another indication that the Saudis bought them with money and caused them to refrain from joining the campaign. What was revealed here again, and not for the first time, is that the Houthis were always a particularly undisciplined factor, with their own agenda.”

In the end, this week’s Iranian move may point to a deep debate taking place within the corridors of power in Tehran. “Iran today is in a dilemma, a huge internal debate that also appears in its media,” Yanai concludes. “The dilemma is whether the proxy concept justified itself, or whether it should be ‘Iran first’, first of all Iran should invest in itself, abandon the proxies, but move quickly to developing nuclear weapons, because that is what will deter its enemies, as in the case of North Korea. Within the Revolutionary Guards, the line supporting proxies is dominant. But if you notice, so far I have not seen either the President of Iran or Parliament Speaker Qalibaf boasting about this attack.”

“It may point to a split in Iran, and to Hezbollah’s weakness, since it cannot deal on its own, but it also points to Israel’s inability to make decisions on its own and organize the Sunni-American-Israeli axis for counteraction,” Yanai explains. “So a situation has developed in which the front that was supposed to emerge, the Israeli-Sunni-American one, is not active, and Iran used this to apply pressure at a very precise point. The proxies are becoming less relevant and less independent for Iran than before.”

Is Israel facing a united front or a network of increasingly weakened, self-interested allies? The answer is probably somewhere in between. What is certain is that this week, in June 2026, the masks were removed: the proxies are no longer just “defenders,” but assets that require active and costly protection from Mother Iran. The question is how long Tehran will be able to keep paying that price.

For contact with the writer: yoghevk@n12.tv

Houthis Hezbollah Hamas Revolutionary Guards IDF

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