Netanyahu Seeks to Reshape Narrative of October 7th for Political Gain

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is actively working to redefine the public's memory of the October 7th Hamas attacks, aiming to separate the security failures of that day from his government's subsequent conduct of the war. According to analyst Michael Shperber, Netanyahu's strategy involves distancing himself from the initial "failure" narrative and positioning himself at the center of the "war" narrative.

Netanyahu is reportedly not just trying to deflect blame for the security lapse but is ambitious to "rewrite the political story" of October 7th. His aim is to transform an event that could have ended his political career into a justification for his continued leadership by the next election. He repeatedly claims that security officials had prior intelligence, chose not to wake him, and that he would have acted differently had he been informed.

While questions about Netanyahu's prior knowledge, his role in the intelligence "conception" failure, and his policy towards Hamas remain, Shperber argues these are secondary to understanding Netanyahu's political maneuver. The core of this strategy is to shape what the public remembers when voting. Netanyahu understands that October 7th cannot be ignored in an election and instead seeks to alter its meaning.

The first step in this redefinition is to disconnect the "failure" from the "war." Netanyahu wants to present them as two distinct events: the first involving intelligence, Shin Bet, the army, and warnings; the second encompassing Gaza, Lebanon, Iran, regional actions, and political decision-making. In the failure narrative, he seeks to be on the periphery, while in the war narrative, he places himself at the center.

This separation shifts the election's focus from how the disaster occurred under his watch to who led Israel through the difficult subsequent years. Netanyahu doesn't need to convince voters he has no responsibility for October 7th, but rather to create a simple distinction between general responsibility and direct blame. He suggests that while he, as Prime Minister, bears general responsibility, direct blame lies with those who received the intelligence that night, misinterpreted it, and failed to wake him.

This narrative is effective because it is simple and compelling: "Others knew. Others erred. Others did not warn. And when Netanyahu finally took the helm, he acted." This transforms the event that should have proven his failure into evidence of his competence. He is not asking supporters to forget the disaster but offering a story that allows them to vote for him within the post-October 7th framework: the system failed, the conception collapsed, and while Netanyahu may bear some responsibility, he was the one who steered Israel through its hardest war and brought it to safety.