Netanyahu’s Coalition Deals Lower Bar for Small Parties to Gain Top Government Roles
Recent remarks by left-wing leader Gadi Eisenkot and criticism from Likud members have highlighted concerns over small parties demanding major government positions, specifically referencing Naftali Bennett’s appointment as Prime Minister despite his party holding only seven Knesset seats. However, this phenomenon did not originate with Bennett. Rather, Benjamin Netanyahu’s long tenure as Prime Minister paved the way for small parties to secure significant ministerial roles in exchange for coalition support, gradually eroding the traditional link between party size and political power.
Historically, major portfolios like Defense and Finance were awarded to parties with substantial Knesset representation. For example, in the late 1980s, the Alignment party needed 39 seats to secure these key ministries. By 2009, Netanyahu had allocated Defense to the Labor Party with just 13 seats and Foreign Affairs to Yisrael Beiteinu with 15 seats, both smaller than the Alignment’s earlier strength. Similarly, Ariel Sharon’s 2003 government gave the Justice Ministry to Shinui with 15 seats, but a decade later, Netanyahu assigned the same ministry to Tzipi Livni’s party holding only six seats, along with responsibility for Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.
The trend continued downward: Ehud Barak led the Defense Ministry with only five seats in his faction, Avigdor Lieberman held it with six seats, and Bennett served as Defense Minister with just three seats. This gradual lowering of the threshold for major posts culminated in Bennett becoming Prime Minister with only seven seats, a position previously reserved for leaders of much larger parties.
Netanyahu’s early political experience, including conflicts with senior ministers from his own party during his first term, taught him the risks of empowering strong figures within his faction. Consequently, he preferred to distribute key roles to smaller coalition partners, reducing internal threats but increasing reliance on minor parties. This strategy transformed ministerial portfolios into bargaining chips, often awarded not based on electoral strength but on coalition necessity.
Yair Lapid further extended this practice by agreeing to a rotation deal that placed Bennett, with seven seats, as Prime Minister first, followed by Lapid himself with 17 seats. Unlike Ariel Sharon, who won a direct popular mandate in 2001, Bennett and Lapid’s premierships were products of coalition agreements rather than broad electoral mandates.
While Netanyahu did not invent coalition bargaining, he significantly lowered the political cost of major ministries, enabling small parties to wield disproportionate influence. Bennett’s rise to Prime Minister with a small party was the logical outcome of this process, though he did not set the precedent. The historical irony lies with Netanyahu, who, in seeking to marginalize rivals, inadvertently normalized the empowerment of small parties in Israel’s political system.
