US, Russia, and China Vie for Long-Term Influence Through Nuclear Reactor Exports
Nuclear power plants are more than infrastructure projects; they establish decades-long strategic partnerships through fuel supply, training, maintenance, and spent fuel management. Currently, 77 reactors are under construction worldwide, with about 120 more planned, mostly in Asia and countries new to nuclear energy or rapidly expanding their programs. For major powers like the US, Russia, and China, each reactor sale locks in technological, financial, and political ties for generations.
A recent example is the July 22 agreement between the US and Saudi Arabia, known as the Section 123 agreement, which aims to open Saudi Arabia’s nuclear market to American companies. The US Department of Energy described it as the foundation for a multi-billion-dollar partnership lasting decades, emphasizing its role in strengthening US competitiveness. Strategically, the US seeks to shape the rules governing Saudi Arabia’s nuclear program, especially given the risk that if Washington does not supply the technology, rivals like Russia, China, or South Korea might.
Russia has made nuclear exports a key geopolitical tool, with Rosatom holding contracts to build 22 reactors in seven countries by the end of 2025. While a reactor itself is not a nuclear weapon, the fuel cycle, uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing, can enable weapons-grade material production. This concern is central to Saudi Arabia, where Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has stated the kingdom would pursue nuclear weapons if Iran does. The US-UAE 2009 agreement, which forbade enrichment and reprocessing, is considered a gold standard, but the Saudi deal’s practical terms remain unclear.
Russia’s model, exemplified by Turkey’s Akkuyu plant, involves Build-Own-Operate contracts, creating deep dependencies unlike those for oil or gas. China, though less advanced in exports, is rapidly building its technological base and operates reactors in Pakistan, aiming to expand. Countries lacking billions to build reactors buy comprehensive packages including credit, construction, fuel, training, and services from state companies, blurring lines between commercial deals and foreign policy.
The risk lies not in reactors being shut down on command but in the concentration of knowledge, services, and financing in suppliers aligned with great powers’ interests. Greater dependency raises the economic and political costs of conflict with those powers. Thus, the US-Saudi nuclear deal is about more than electricity; it is a contest over who will guide Saudi Arabia’s nuclear capabilities and set the limits of its program.
