Between attrition and decision in the Iran-Israel confrontation
Hours before President Donald Trump announced a major breakthrough in talks between Iran and the United States, fresh developments on the Iranian and Lebanese fronts threatened to push the region back toward wider war. The recent short exchange of fire between Iran and Israel was, in the article’s view, the culmination of an Iranian attempt to impose a new rule: a direct Iranian response to an Israeli strike in Beirut. In Tehran’s eyes, Hezbollah is not merely a regional ally but a core part of Iran’s national security concept.
The article says it is still too early to know whether Israel’s strike in Beirut managed to separate the Iranian file from the Lebanese one. A clearer answer will come only if Israel strikes Beirut again and Iran responds. Iran’s deep influence over Hezbollah, however, gives Tehran the ability to calibrate the level of escalation. In Lebanon, too, there is growing recognition that implementing any ceasefire depends less on the Lebanese government than on Hezbollah and, even more so, on Tehran. Lebanese negotiator Simon Karam said progress with Israel is hard to imagine unless Hezbollah commits to the emerging arrangements. Hezbollah-linked Lebanese journalist Ibrahim Al-Amin also argued that Iran will not abandon the group and that its commitment is part of the Islamic Republic’s doctrine.
At the same time, the Iran-US confrontation has entered a new phase of attrition. Trump, frustrated by Tehran’s delay in answering the latest American proposal and by its refusal to accept his demands, has moved to a policy of negotiating under fire, combining military and economic pressure. Recent American strikes in Iran were meant to reduce capabilities that could threaten shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and to force Iran to soften its position and strike a deal. Yet Iranian media insisted this week that Tehran will not give at the negotiating table what it refused to concede under fire. A Tasnim analysis, tied to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, urged Iran to respond to American “foolishness” in a way that deters Washington, not through concessions.
For Israel, some see the widening US-Iran confrontation as helpful because it could exhaust Iran, worsen its economic strain, and possibly block a deal that would not satisfy Israel, especially on the nuclear issue. But the article argues that even 40 days of heavy fighting and weeks of economic pressure have not produced that result, and there is still no sign Tehran is ready to soften. Even a renewed full-scale war might not stop Iran’s path to nuclear weapons unless Israel undertakes a risky operation that significantly damages underground nuclear facilities and removes remaining highly enriched uranium stocks. The current state, neither war nor peace, may delay an unfavorable settlement, but it is not sustainable. With Iran continuing to show confidence and risk tolerance, and with rising skepticism in the United States about another war, Israel may find it harder to secure future American backing.
