Everyone Wants the Religious Zionists: The Four Mandates Roiling Israeli Politics

After hundreds of days in reserve duty, an unprecedented crisis with the ultra-Orthodox public, and growing disappointment with Bezalel Smotrich, significant parts of the Religious Zionist community find themselves without a clear political home. Likud, Bennett, Eisenkot, Lieberman, and new initiatives still taking shape behind the scenes are all competing for the same votes. In a political system often decided by a single mandate, the battle over Religious Zionist votes could determine the next election.

One voice that perhaps more than any other illustrates the upheaval this entire public is experiencing is Sani Eisenberg. At the time of our conversation, Eisenberg, who is part of the Religious Zionist community, was on reserve duty in southern Lebanon. Between missions, in conversations among the platoon of religious and secular fighters, people from the right and the center, the same question keeps coming up again and again, who do you even vote for in the next election? “There is a feeling that people are just waiting,” he says. “Waiting to see whether another option appears, whether there will be an alliance, whether someone will make a move. A lot of people still do not know who they will vote for.” Eisenberg, a reservist and member of the National Religious Reservists Forum, describes a public in an unusual state compared with recent election cycles. In his view, in the past most voters knew fairly clearly where their political home was. This time, even those who may eventually vote again for the Religious Zionist Party often do so because they lack a better alternative. “If in the past people voted out of identification and connection, today it comes from a place of no better option,” he says. “A lot of people still do not know who they will vote for.”

The feeling may tell the most important political story of the next election. For decades, Religious Zionists knew how to gather around clear political frameworks, from the National Religious Party to the Jewish Home and then the Religious Zionist Party. But for the first time in many years, large parts of the sector feel that the political map no longer fully reflects their priorities. The result is an unprecedented struggle over what the political system now calls “the four sacred mandates”, those national-religious voters who have not yet decided whom to support and who may tip the balance in the next election.

According to a special analysis conducted by the Madgam Institute, headed by Mano Geva, for N12 Magazine and based on the four latest Channel 12 News polls, the Religious Zionist Party still enjoys the highest support among respondents who defined themselves as religious, but it is far from the hegemony that characterized the sector in previous election cycles. If in the past the draft issue was mainly a matter of principle for the sector, the war has made it personal.

Alongside it, other parties in the right-wing bloc also receive significant support, while a double-digit share of respondents still have not decided whom they will vote for. It is important to note that this is not a sample of Religious Zionist voters alone, but of all respondents who defined themselves as “religious”, not ultra-Orthodox, traditional, or secular. Even so, the data provide an interesting glimpse into the struggle now taking place over the sector’s votes.

Professor Asher Cohen of Bar-Ilan University’s Department of Political Science insists, even before analyzing the trends, on correcting the term itself. “Whenever they say to me ‘the Religious Zionists,’ I immediately correct them and say, the Religious Zionisms,” he says. “It is not proper Hebrew, but it is Religious Zionisms. The vote is also split across a very wide range.” And yet, he says, one thing is common and clear. “Eighty-five percent of Religious Zionists, if you ask them, will define themselves as right wing. In some shade, but right wing.”

That figure matters, because it defines the boundaries of this battle. Most undecided voters in the Religious Zionist sector are not looking to move to the center-left. They have not become Meretz voters, nor classic centrist voters. Many still want a right-wing government, still identify with the right’s security and national outlook, and still find it hard to imagine voting for a party clearly associated with the other bloc. The problem is that they are no longer sure the existing coalition parties represent them.

Here the trap begins. On the one hand, the Religious Zionists are a clearly right-wing public. On the other hand, the “full right-wing” government depends almost entirely on the ultra-Orthodox parties. And since October 7, that dependence has become for many in the sector a political and moral burden that is almost unbearable. “There is not a home in the Religious Zionist sector today without reservists, and no one who does not know someone close who was killed,” Cohen says. “But they are right wing. It is a terrible trap. A right-wing government is only possible with the ultra-Orthodox, and they want a right-wing government. But on the other hand there is tremendous anger.”

If in the past the draft issue was mainly theoretical for the sector, the war has made it personal. For years, the debate over ultra-Orthodox exemptions played out in the political arena, sometimes as a symbol and sometimes as leverage in coalition negotiations. But after hundreds of days of reserve duty, families who saw sons and fathers leave home again and again, and a particularly high number of fallen soldiers among Religious Zionists, the question is no longer merely theoretical.

Dr. Ariel Finkelstein, who studies religious society at the Israel Democracy Institute, believes the crisis is deeper than a dispute over one clause or another in the draft exemption law. “There is something here beyond the practical draft question,” he says. “Among part of the public there is a feeling that something in the value base that underpinned this political camp has cracked in some way.” According to him, the criticism is not aimed only at ultra-Orthodox politicians. “For many national-religious people there was a story in their head about what the ‘believing camp’ looked like. Much of the criticism is not necessarily about the politicians. It is also a question of, why did you not come, why did you not enlist?”

Finkelstein describes a process of disillusionment. For years, many in the Religious Zionist community believed the ultra-Orthodox society was becoming more integrated into Israeli society, but what happened after October 7 gave them a stinging slap in the face. “They thought the ultra-Orthodox were much more Israeli and involved, and that there were certain processes,” he says. “The war basically exposed that there is something else here.”

From this also came the phrase that recurs in conversations with sector figures, “the covenant of those who serve.” Not a partnership based only on religious identity or belonging to the believing camp, but a political partnership with those who bear the burden.

Eisenberg hears this again and again in reserve duty conversations. “In reserves you hear people from all camps saying they want to see Naftali Bennett, Benjamin Netanyahu, Bezalel Smotrich, Gadi Eisenkot and Avigdor Lieberman sitting together,” he says. “Not because everyone agrees on everything, but because people are looking for a little sanity and want those who bear the burden to know how to work together.”

The internal numbers worrying Smotrich This upheaval is also being translated into numbers. Eisenberg, who conducted an independent poll among voters for the Religious Zionist Party from the last election, found that only 48% say they will vote for it again. Another quarter are still undecided. Another troubling figure for Smotrich, more than six in ten Religious Zionist voters expressed a desire to see Yisrael Beiteinu and Bennett’s party in the government, while fewer than half wanted to see United Torah Judaism or Shas there.

According to Eisenberg, the root of the crisis is not settlement, security policy, or the conduct of the war. “On most issues the public still agrees with the party,” he says. “The main story shaking voters is the ultra-Orthodox issue, the draft exemption law and the question of whether to continue the same political alliance. There is no other issue where the public is not in full agreement with the party.”

The broader data also show how fragmented the field is. According to Central Bureau of Statistics data, about 12% of adult Jews in Israel define themselves as religious, a group estimated at about 700,000 to 800,000 people. Within that group is the national-religious public, which according to various estimates is an electoral force of about 12 mandates, but in practice is split among several parties.

In the last election, about 516,000 people voted for the Religious Zionist Party. In Efrat it received about 48% of the vote, in Givat Shmuel about 24%, in Modiin about 10%, and in Itamar support surged to about 88%. According to Finkelstein’s research, in the last election three parties captured 80% of the sector’s votes, 30% for the Religious Zionist Party, 27% for Yamina, and 23% for Likud.

The picture emerging from all the data is of a public far more divided than before. If in the past a large share of religious voters gathered around one or two parties, today the votes are spreading among the Religious Zionist Party, Likud, Otzma Yehudit, opposition parties, and a significant bloc of undecideds.

“Smotrich? His base is something like three mandates” Ofer Inbar, a strategic consultant and political campaign manager, believes Smotrich’s problem began even before the draft exemption law. In his view, the chairman of the Religious Zionist Party spent the term mainly addressing his Haredi-national base and residents of Judea and Samaria. “His base is something like three mandates, between 2.5 and 3 mandates,” he says. “He put a lot of emphasis on what he would try to advance for the benefit of Judea and Samaria, and it is costing him dearly.”

According to him, classic Religious Zionists, residents of Petah Tikva, Mazkeret Batya, families of high-tech workers and reservists, are in a different place. “It is an ethos that does not oppose Torah study, but it supports a real law, supports the Haredim going to work, paying taxes and being productive like the national-religious sector or the general public.”

Some of the undecided Religious Zionists want Netanyahu replaced, but find it hard to see themselves joining a classic “anyone but Bibi” camp. For some, there are identity and cultural gaps with the center-left camp, and for others, concern that the zeal to oust Netanyahu could lead to concessions to the ultra-Orthodox or to sitting with Arab parties. In this vacuum move figures who offer, or may offer, another political address, including Chili Tropper, Yoaz Hendel and Ayelet Shaked.

This search for an alternative right-wing, state-oriented home is what has been fueling recent talk of creating a new political framework, one aimed precisely at the same audience, moderate national-religious voters, former Likud voters, reservists and right-wing voters who find it difficult to continue with Netanyahu but are not prepared to move to the opposing camp. Names mentioned in this context include Gilad Erdan, Yuli Edelstein, Moshe Kahlon, Dadi Shami and Amir Avivi.

Erdan has already confirmed in an interview with Channel 12 that he is considering establishing a unifying right-wing party. “I am not a centrist, I am a clear right-winger,” he said, explaining that there is a large public tired of the two options it sees, a right-wing government dependent on the ultra-Orthodox parties on one hand, and a left-center bloc dependent on problematic partnerships on the other.

Inbar estimates that if such a party is formed, it could quickly become an address for many undecided voters. “The key is Erdan,” he says. “If Erdan forms a party, he will bring in the Religious Zionists who are still undecided.”

And what about Winter? Reserve Brig. Gen. Ofer Winter is repeatedly mentioned as someone who could join Smotrich or run independently. In parts of the right he embodies a combative, faith-driven, anti-establishment figure. But Inbar is skeptical. “Winter is not worth many mandates in my estimation,” he says. “If he is worth anything, he sits on Smotrich’s ticket. You did nothing here.” According to him, the advantage of not being tainted by the draft exemption issue is offset by a style that is seen as too belligerent by the classic Religious Zionist public. “It does not connect with that language,” he says.

Netanyahu, for his part, understands the danger היטב. Unlike in previous election cycles, when he tried to siphon votes from bloc parties to enlarge Likud, this time the task is different. Inbar puts it this way: “This time he must not siphon votes, he has to water. Help Bezalel get over the threshold, not hurt him, and maybe try to bring in someone else who can bring votes from within the Religious Zionist sector.” The reason is simple, if Smotrich does not pass the electoral threshold, the entire bloc could pay a heavy price.

In the end, the battle over the Religious Zionists is not just a battle over a party. It is a battle over identity. This public is still mostly right wing, still connected to settlement, the army, tradition and the idea of the state. But it is also angry at the ultra-Orthodox, disappointed in Smotrich, does not fully forgive Bennett, is considering Eisenkot and Lieberman, and is waiting to see whether a new right-wing party will emerge that allows it to tell itself it voted right wing, without voting again for the same political system it has grown disappointed with.

Finkelstein believes that in the end most of the national-religious public will remain in the coalition bloc. “It is pretty clear to me that most of the national-religious public will vote for that bloc,” he says. “The question is how much that majority will shrink.” Cohen says much the same: the overwhelming majority will not move to the opposition bloc, but the feeling of “there is no home” is real, deep and burning.

The next election may well be decided right there, in the gray area between ideological loyalty and political disappointment. Between those who want a right-wing government and those no longer willing to take the old alliance with the ultra-Orthodox for granted. Between those who do not want Lapid and those who do not want to vote for Smotrich again. Between the synagogue, reserve duty and the ballot box.

“The real message I hear from reservists,” Eisenberg says, “is the desire for someone to stand up and say that his first priority is a government of unity among those who serve. A lot of people are simply waiting for someone to say that out loud.” Until someone does, parts of the Religious Zionist public appear likely to remain on the fence. And in a country where elections are often decided by a single mandate, the public sitting on the fence is not marginal. It could be the public that decides who sits in the prime minister’s office.