Everyone Wants the Religious Zionists: The Four Seats That Could Upend the Political Map

After hundreds of days of reserve duty, an unprecedented crisis with the ultra-Orthodox public and growing disappointment with Bezalel Smotrich, significant parts of the Religious Zionist sector find themselves without a clear political home. Likud, Bennett, Eisenkot, Liberman and new initiatives still taking shape behind the scenes are all competing for the same votes. In a political system repeatedly decided by a single mandate, the battle for Religious Zionism could determine the outcome of the next election.

One voice that perhaps more than anything illustrates the upheaval this entire public is going through is Sany Eisenberg. At the time of our conversation, Eisenberg, a member of the Religious Zionist camp, was on reserve duty in southern Lebanon. Between missions, in conversations in the platoon among religious and secular fighters, right-wing and centrist figures, the same question keeps coming up: who do you even vote for in the next election? “There is a feeling that people are simply waiting,” he says. “Waiting to see if another option appears, if there will be an alliance, if someone will make a move. A lot of people still do not know who they will vote for.” Eisenberg, a reservist and member of the National Religious Reservists Forum, describes a public in an unusual state compared with recent election cycles. In his view, in the past most voters more or less knew where their political home was. This time, even those who may eventually vote again for the Religious Zionist Party are often doing so because they have no good alternative. “If in the past the vote came from identification and connection, today it comes from a lack of a better option,” he says. “A lot of people still do not know who they will vote for.”

“The Four Sacred Mandates”

That feeling may tell the most important political story of the next election. For decades, Religious Zionism knew how to gather around clear political frameworks, from the National Religious Party to The Jewish Home to the Religious Zionist Party. But for the first time in many years, large parts of the sector feel that the political map no longer fully reflects their priorities. The result is an unprecedented struggle over what the political system now calls “the four sacred mandates”, those National Religious voters who have not yet decided whom to support and who may tip the balance in the next election.

According to a special analysis conducted by the Madgam Institute headed by Mano Geva for N12 magazine, based on the four most recent Channel 12 News polls, the Religious Zionist Party still enjoys the highest support among respondents who defined themselves as religious, but it is far from the hegemony that characterized the sector in previous election cycles. If in the past the draft exemption issue was mainly a matter of principle for the sector, the war has made it personal. Protest against the draft | Photo: Flash90

Alongside it, other parties in the right-wing bloc are also receiving significant support, while a double-digit share of respondents still has not decided whom to vote for. It should be emphasized that this is not a sample of Religious Zionist voters only, but of all respondents who defined themselves as “religious”, not ultra-Orthodox, traditional, or secular. Even so, the data provides an interesting glimpse into the struggle now taking place for the sector’s votes.

The battle over the kippah

Prof. Asher Cohen of Bar-Ilan University’s Department of Political Science takes care, even before analyzing the trends, to correct the term itself. “Whenever they say to me ‘the Religious Zionists,’ I immediately correct it and say, the Religious Zionisms,” he says. “It is not proper Hebrew, but it is Religious Zionisms. The voting also splits across a very wide spectrum.” Even so, he says, one thing is shared and clear: “85% of Religious Zionists, if you ask them, will define themselves as right-wing. In some shade, but right-wing.”

That figure is important because it defines the limits of this battle. Most of the undecided Religious Zionists are not looking to move to the center-left. They have not become Meretz voters, nor classic centrists. Many still want a right-wing government, still identify with the right’s security and national outlook, and still struggle to see themselves voting for a party that is clearly identified with the other bloc. The problem is that they are no longer sure the existing parties in the coalition bloc represent them.

This is where the trap begins. On the one hand, Religious Zionism is clearly a right-wing public. On the other hand, the “full right-wing” government depends almost entirely on the ultra-Orthodox parties. And since October 7, that dependence has become for many in the sector a political and moral burden almost impossible to bear. “There is no home in Religious Zionism today that does not have people in reserve duty, and no one who does not know someone, directly or indirectly, who was killed,” Cohen says. “But they are right-wing. It is an awful trap. A right-wing government is only possible with the ultra-Orthodox, and they want a right-wing government. But on the other hand there is terrible rage.”

If in the past the draft issue was mainly a matter of principle in the sector, the war turned it into a personal one. For years, the debate over exemptions for the ultra-Orthodox took place in the political arena, sometimes as a symbol, sometimes as leverage in coalition negotiations. But after hundreds of days of reserve duty, families watching sons and fathers leave home again and again, and a particularly high number of fallen among members of Religious Zionism, the question is no longer merely theoretical.

Dr. Ariel Finkelstein, a researcher of religious society at the Israel Democracy Institute, believes the crisis goes deeper than the argument over any one clause in a draft exemption law. “There is something here beyond the practical question of enlistment,” he says. “Among part of the public there is a feeling that something in the value base that underpinned this political camp has cracked in a certain way.” According to him, the criticism is not aimed only at ultra-Orthodox politicians. “Many national religious people had a story in their heads about what the ‘faith camp’ looks like. Much of the criticism is not necessarily about the politicians. It is also a question of, ‘Why didn’t you come, why didn’t you enlist?’” Finkelstein describes a process of disillusionment. For years, many in Religious Zionism believed the ultra-Orthodox society was increasingly integrating into Israeli society, but what happened after October 7 gave them a stinging slap in the face. “They thought the ultra-Orthodox were much more Israeli and involved, and that there were certain processes,” he says. “The war basically exposed that there is something else here.”

From this also came the phrase that keeps recurring in conversations with sector figures, the “servants’ alliance.” Not an alliance based only on religious identity or belonging to the faith camp, but a political partnership with those who bear the burden.

Eisenberg hears this again and again in reserve duty conversations. “In reserve duty you hear from people from every camp that they want to see Naftali Bennett, Benjamin 3, Bezalel Smotrich, Gadi Eisenkot and Avigdor Liberman sitting together,” he says. “Not because everyone agrees about everything, but because people are looking for some sanity and want those who bear the burden to know how to work together.”

The internal numbers worrying Smotrich

That upheaval is also translating into numbers. Eisenberg, who conducted an independent poll among voters for the Religious Zionist Party from the last election, found that only 48% say they will vote for it again. Another quarter are still undecided. Another troubling figure for Smotrich, more than six in ten Religious Zionist voters said they would like Yisrael Beytenu and Bennett’s party in the government, while fewer than half said the same about United Torah Judaism or Shas.

According to Eisenberg, the root of the crisis is not settlement, security policy, or the war. “On most issues the public still agrees with the party,” he says. “The main story shaking the voters is the ultra-Orthodox issue, the draft exemption law and the question of whether to continue the same political alliance. There is no other issue on which the public is not in complete agreement with the party.”

The broader data also shows how fragmented the arena has become. According to Central Bureau of Statistics data, about 12% of adult Jews in Israel define themselves as religious, a group estimated at about 700,000 to 800,000 people. Within that group is the national religious public, which according to various estimates is an electoral force of about 12 mandates, but in practice it splits among several parties. In the last election, about 516,000 people voted for the Religious Zionist Party. In Efrat it received about 48% of the vote, in Givat Shmuel about 24%, in Modi’in about 10%, and in Itamar support surged to about 88%.

According to Finkelstein’s research, in the last election three parties captured 80% of the sector’s votes, 30% for the Religious Zionist Party, 27% for Yamina and 23% for Likud. The picture that emerges from all the data is of a much more fragmented public than before. If in the past a large share of religious voters gathered around one or two parties, today the votes are spread among the Religious Zionist Party, Likud, Otzma Yehudit, opposition parties and a significant slice of undecided voters.

Smotrich? “His base is something like three mandates,” says Ofer Inbar, a strategic consultant and political campaign manager. According to him, Smotrich’s problem began even before the draft exemption law. Throughout the term, he says, the Religious Zionist leader mainly addressed the hardline religious Zionist base and residents of Judea and Samaria. “His base is something like 3 mandates, between 2.5 and 3 mandates,” he says. “He put a lot of emphasis on what he would try to advance for the benefit of Judea and Samaria, and that is costing him dearly.”

In his view, classic Religious Zionism, residents of Petah Tikva, Mazkeret Batya, families of high-tech workers and reservists, is in a different place. “This is a character that does not oppose Torah study, but it is in favor of a real law, in favor of the ultra-Orthodox going to work, paying taxes, and being productive like the national religious sector or the general sector.”

Poster boy turned former poster boy

A little more than a decade ago it seemed Bennett had found the formula. The Jewish Home, led by him and joined by Ayelet Shaked, won 12 mandates in the 2013 election and presented a new, self-confident Religious Zionism that combined high-tech, security, open religiosity and a hawkish security line. But since then, the relationship between Bennett and the sector has gone through nearly every possible crisis, Yamina, the government of change, and now the renewed partnership with Yair Lapid.

Cohen believes Bennett did more than establish a government many in the sector opposed, he shattered an identity axis. “There was one relatively homogeneous axis, and that was the general political axis,” he explains. “The overwhelming majority defined themselves as right-wing. What Bennett did was beyond politics. Bennett broke the axis. He went and formed a left-wing government, and that is what drove people crazy.”

Eisenberg says: “He is no longer fighting for the Religious Zionist vote.”

Eisenberg, who voted for Bennett several times in the past, describes a mutual break. “He is no longer fighting for the Religious Zionist vote, and Religious Zionism no longer sees him as its representative,” he says. According to him, there is anger toward Bennett, but even more significant is the feeling that Bennett himself chose to turn to other audiences. “I definitely will not vote for him again,” he says. “It is not even from a sense of betrayal as it is for many others, but mainly because he himself is no longer interested in representing Religious Zionism. The gap in positions between him and Yair Lapid is so enormous that it is not clear how he expects anyone from Religious Zionism to join that.”

Inbar sharpens the point. In his view, the connection between Bennett and Lapid is the central mistake that left soft-right voters and Religious Zionism without a home. “If Bennett had not made that alliance, I think people in Religious Zionism would not have had a problem voting for him,” he says. “Bennett was ostensibly considered soft right. But the moment he chose to make that move, it started losing interest.”

“Change government created a crack with part of the public”

In Bennett’s party, they believe the fight for Religious Zionist votes is far from lost for him. Deep-dive studies and focus groups conducted in recent months show that alongside the lingering anger in hardline religious Zionist circles after the formation of the change government, there is renewed openness toward him among urban national religious voters, reservists, professionals and middle class Religious Zionist families. According to them, Bennett’s electoral potential within Religious Zionism is currently 3 to 5 mandates.

“There is no doubt that the change government created a crack with part of the public, especially the hardline sector,” says a senior party source. “But in the large concentrations of Religious Zionism, Givat Shmuel, Petah Tikva, Ra’anana, and among lawyers, accountants, high-tech workers and professionals, the more people do reserve duty, the more the tendency is pro-Bennett.”

Polls and focus groups they conducted showed the feeling that the Religious Zionist Party no longer represents the serving national religious public. “The Religious Zionist public is grinding through reserve duty on insane scales and does not understand why Smotrich and Itamar Ben Gvir have become puppets of Aryeh Deri and Yitzhak Goldknopf,” the senior source says. “They say, he does not represent us. There is no one who has fought harder for the draft exemption law than Smotrich. Every time I am surprised מחדש by the intensity of the anger at him over this issue.”

At the same time, the party understands that even today there are many national religious voters who are wary of Bennett’s future political partners. “Questions about Yair Golan and the composition of the next government come up in almost every meeting,” the senior source admits. “We see that they want it, but they are afraid.” According to him, Bennett’s answer is the creation of a broad “Zionist alliance” that will not harm the settlement enterprise. “The next government will not harm settlement,” that source says. “Even in the previous government, Labor and Meretz sat there, and Bennett still did not evacuate a single house, did not give up a centimeter of land, and did not freeze construction. The main energy will be to bring the ultra-Orthodox into Israeli society, deal with the cost of living and law and order problems, alongside continued development of settlement.”

The new suitors

Into this space has also entered Gadi Eisenkot, who has accelerated his effort to win right-wing and Religious Zionist votes. The campaign of the “Yashar! with Eisenkot” party, which appeared in Shabbat leaflets and in national religious sector websites, was designed to signal exactly where he is heading. “There is an alternative. Values. Zionism. Security,” read the ads, which feature Eisenkot alongside Matan Kahana, Orit Farkash-Hacohen and Yoram Cohen. The party seeks to emphasize strengthening the national religious wing and the attempt to reach audiences that previously voted Likud or the Religious Zionist Party.

According to sources familiar with the campaign, the decision to address the sector was made after internal deep polls showed that Eisenkot had not yet exhausted his potential among the national religious public. The aim is mainly toward stately right-wing voters, reservists and voters who identify ideologically with the right, but are disappointed with Netanyahu, the alliance with the ultra-Orthodox and the line led by Smotrich and Ben Gvir.

Avigdor Liberman also identified the fracture and recruited a series of figures associated with the sector and with the periphery, including Yossi Brodny, Rafi Ben Shitrit, Sharon Sharabi, Israel Ben Shitrit and Batya Kahana-Dror. “He is a symbol of secularism, but he is also a symbol of consistency,” Inbar explains. “Classic Religious Zionism has no problem living with secular people. It lives with them in the army, in high-tech, and can also live with them in politics.” Even so, he estimates that Liberman’s ceiling in the sector is limited and that he can attract at most one mandate from it, but not become its main political home.

The phantom party of the right

Although some of the undecided in Religious Zionism want to replace Netanyahu, they find it difficult to see themselves joining what they perceive as classic “just not Bibi” politics. For some, this reflects identity and cultural gaps with the center-left camp, and for others a fear that the zeal to oust Netanyahu could lead to concessions to the ultra-Orthodox or to sitting with Arab parties.

In that vacuum, figures are circulating who offer, or may offer, another political home, including Chili Tropper, Yoaz Hendel and Ayelet Shaked. That search for a national right-wing alternative is what has fueled recent months’ talk of establishing a new political framework, one that would appeal exactly to that same audience, moderate national religious voters, former Likud supporters, reservists and right-wing voters who find it difficult to continue with Netanyahu but are not prepared to move to the opposing camp.

Among the names mentioned in this context are Gideon Sa’ar, Yuli Edelstein, Moshe Kahlon, Dedi Shmihi and Amir Avivi. Sa’ar has already confirmed in an interview with Channel 12 News that he is considering establishing a unifying right-wing party.

“I am not a centrist, I am a clear right-winger,” he said, explaining that there is a large public that is fed up with the two options it sees today, a right-wing government dependent on the ultra-Orthodox parties on the one hand, and a left-center bloc dependent on problematic partnerships from its point of view on the other. Inbar estimates that if such a party is formed, it could quickly become an address for a large share of the undecided. “The key is Sa’ar,” he says. “If Sa’ar establishes a party, he will bring the undecided Religious Zionists.”

And what about Winter?

Brig. Gen. (res.) Ofer Winter is mentioned again and again as someone who may join Smotrich or run independently. For parts of the right, he embodies a combative, faith-based, anti-establishment figure. But Inbar is skeptical. “Winter is not worth many mandates in my assessment,” he says. “If he is worth anything, he sits on Smotrich’s ticket. You have done nothing at all there.” According to him, the advantage of not being tainted by the draft exemption issue is offset by a style seen as too inflammatory in the eyes of classic Religious Zionism. “It does not connect to that language,” he says.

Netanyahu, for his part, understands the danger very well. Unlike in previous election cycles, when he tried to siphon votes from bloc parties to enlarge Likud, this time the mission is different. Inbar puts it this way: “This time he must not siphon votes, he needs to water them. Help Bezalel pass, not hurt him, and perhaps try to bring in someone else who will bring votes from within Religious Zionism.” The reason is simple, if Smotrich does not pass the electoral threshold, the entire bloc could pay a heavy price.

The question that will decide the election

Ultimately, the battle for Religious Zionism is not only a battle over a party. It is a battle over identity. This public is still mostly right-wing, still connected to settlement, the army, tradition and the statist idea. But it is also angry at the ultra-Orthodox, disappointed in Smotrich, not entirely forgiving of Bennett, examining Eisenkot and Liberman, and waiting to see whether a new right-wing party will be formed that allows it to tell itself it voted right, without voting again for the same political system it has grown disillusioned with.

Finkelstein estimates that most of the national religious public will ultimately remain in the coalition bloc. “It is pretty clear to me that most of the national religious public will vote for that bloc,” he says. “The question is how much that majority will shrink.” Cohen says similar things, the overwhelming majority will not move to the opposition bloc, but the feeling of “no home” is real, deep and burning.

The next election may be decided exactly there, in the gray area between ideological loyalty and political disappointment. Between those who want a right-wing government and those who are no longer willing to accept the old alliance with the ultra-Orthodox as self-evident. Between those who do not want Lapid and those who do not want to vote for Smotrich again. Between the synagogue, reserve duty and the ballot box.

“The real voice I hear from reservists,” says Eisenberg, “is the desire for someone to stand up and say that his first priority is a unity government of those who serve. A lot of people are simply waiting for someone to say it out loud.” Until someone says it, it appears that parts of Religious Zionism will continue to sit on the fence. And in a country where elections are sometimes decided by a single mandate, the public sitting on the fence is not marginal. It could be the public that decides who sits in the prime minister’s office.

Benjamin Netanyahu, Bezalel Smotrich, Naftali Bennett