Former Shin Bet Chief Calls for Broad Inquiry into Hamas Growth Since 1980s
Micha Kobi, a former senior official of Israel's Shin Bet security service, has urged the national inquiry committee to investigate not only the events of October 7 but also a series of intelligence and operational decisions dating back to the 1980s that contributed to Hamas's strengthening. In an interview with Channel 7, Kobi highlighted his experience interrogating key Hamas figures such as Ahmed Yassin, Yahya Sinwar, and Salah Shehadeh before Hamas's official establishment, when it was known as the Islamic Jihad Movement. He criticized Israel's long-standing intelligence failures and policies, including prisoner release deals and insufficient border surveillance, which allowed Hamas to amass weapons and build attack tunnels.
Kobi recounted his 1983 decision to arrest a suspected traitor who revealed the formation of the extremist Islamic movement, and a 1989 arrest that prevented an early massacre. He stressed that Shin Bet was unaware of Hamas's name or activities during the 1987 Intifada and only learned about its military structure and plans after interrogating over 500 operatives. However, a legal controversy following a prisoner's death led to plea bargains and the release of many militants, including prominent Hamas terrorists who later carried out numerous suicide attacks.
He also criticized the closure of Prisoner Interrogation Unit 504 and transferring its responsibilities to Shin Bet, which he said lacked the manpower to provide adequate war warnings. Kobi accused several Shin Bet heads, including those appointed by former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, of failing in their roles due to misplaced priorities and lack of relevant expertise. He called for a neutral, apolitical investigation into these systemic failures and highlighted past political interference in Shin Bet leadership appointments, citing the case of Yaakov Perry, who falsely claimed military service.
Kobi concluded that Israel missed multiple opportunities to neutralize Hamas early on and that the intelligence service's leadership problems significantly contributed to the current security crisis. He emphasized the need for thorough examination of decisions from the mid-1980s onward to prevent future failures.
