A series of naval incidents between Israel and Turkey, including one that nearly escalated into a sea battle, has pushed Israeli defense thinking toward treating Ankara as a possible future adversary. The latest close call happened a few weeks ago during an Israeli Navy exercise near Cyprus, when a missile boat operating in the so-called Cyprus Channel west of the island was approached at speed by four Turkish destroyers and shadowed at a distance of only a few hundred meters before the Turkish ships eventually withdrew.
The episode was one in a pattern of repeated tense encounters in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey has been expanding its naval capabilities for years under President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s “Blue Homeland” doctrine, which aims to project power across the Black Sea, Aegean Sea and Mediterranean and challenge Greek and Cypriot claims to maritime zones. The doctrine also underpins Turkish oil and gas exploration in disputed waters and has already fueled sharp friction with Greece, Cyprus, Egypt and the European Union, especially after Turkey’s maritime agreement with Libya created a corridor cutting across areas Athens claims.
Israel now sees the Turkish buildup as requiring a new maritime posture. The Israeli Navy, which is much smaller than Turkey’s fleet, is replacing its aging Saar 4.5 missile boats with new Reshef-class vessels built at Israel Shipyards, while most of the old Nirit boats will be upgraded. Navy Commander Rear Adm. Eyal Harel said, “We may find ourselves in the coming years in conflict not only in Syria but also against Turkey.” The overall procurement and force-build plan is estimated at about $20 billion over the next decade.
Israel’s answer is a layered regional network. Its military axis with Greece and Cyprus includes joint annual plans, exercises, intelligence sharing, regular three-way air force coordination and a proposed rapid-response force of brigade size, about 2,500 fighters with F-35 aircraft. The energy dimension includes the East Mediterranean Gas Forum, which coordinates gas exports to Europe, and the Great Sea Interconnector power cable linking Israel, Cyprus and Greece. The United States is the fourth pillar through the 3+1 forum, the East Mediterranean Energy Center in Washington, and cyber-defense cooperation for critical energy infrastructure. The article says all details were cleared for publication by military censors.
