As American and Iranian delegations head home from Switzerland, the article argues that Israelis are focusing on the wrong issue. The real question is not whether Hezbollah can be disarmed, because Washington also understands that no international force is going to enter Lebanon, seize tens of thousands of rockets, and crush the region’s strongest Shiite militia. Iran, meanwhile, has made clear that Hezbollah in Lebanon is central to its efforts and that a complete ceasefire is a precondition for talks.
The piece says the more immediate danger is Iran’s use of the Strait of Hormuz as leverage in the negotiations. In recent days, Tehran tied progress in the Swiss talks to stability in Lebanon, delayed the opening of the talks after fighting escalated between Israel and Hezbollah, and linked Israeli activity in Lebanon to the implementation of understandings with Washington. At the same time, Iran’s Khatam al-Anbiya headquarters threatened to close Hormuz, saying the United States and Israel were not meeting their commitments, partly because Israel continued operating in southern Lebanon.
The author argues that the new and dangerous development is that Hormuz is no longer just a wartime deterrent, but part of the bargaining process itself. The message, the article says, is that if Iran’s demands in Lebanon are not accepted, and if Israel is not forced to withdraw or restrain Jerusalem, the strait will be threatened. That, the piece says, challenges the post-World War II order built on free navigation, open trade routes, and protected global energy arteries.
The article warns that the broader risk is not only Iran’s threat but the precedent it sets. If the West adjusts policy in response to pressure on Hormuz or other shipping lanes, it could encourage the idea that the West is vulnerable to coercion. It says tomorrow the Houthis in the Red Sea, or another radical force elsewhere, could use the same tactic. Israel, it argues, should not expect someone else to dismantle Hezbollah, but should keep coordinating with Washington, work with Europe and moderate Arab states, and preserve minimal freedom of action in southern Lebanon so Hezbollah does not return to the border.
The piece concludes that Israel must both explain to the U.S. that Lebanon is not just an Israeli problem and prepare for the possibility that persuasion will fail. If Washington presses for a full Israeli withdrawal that erases military gains and lets Hezbollah back to the frontier, Israel will need to decide where its own red lines are.
