Netanyahu's 'Miscalculation' Claim Contradicted by Timeline, Officials

The Prime Minister's Office released a timeline of Benjamin Netanyahu's actions on October 7th, stating it was a response to "misleading publications." However, the timeline omits key events and updates, including a crucial briefing to the military secretary before the Hamas attack and Netanyahu's call with Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte. This omission has fueled speculation that Netanyahu was kept in the dark about the impending massacre.

Former senior security officials expressed shock at Netanyahu's claim that he was not awakened to avoid "miscalculation" with Hamas. Evidence from October 6th and 7th suggests Netanyahu himself repeatedly advocated for avoiding military actions against Hamas, Hezbollah, and Iran to prevent "miscalculation," a term he used in closed discussions. This policy, characterized by a desire to "distance conflicts as much as possible" to foster national prosperity, meant that confronting threats like those from Gaza was avoided unless absolutely necessary.

Prior to October 7th, on October 1st, Netanyahu received recommendations from IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi and Shin Bet head Ronen Bar to prepare for attacks in Gaza, including targeting Sinwar or launching a broader campaign. Netanyahu, however, focused on normalization with Saudi Arabia and spoke of "retaliatory actions" in Gaza, emphasizing "delicate management to maintain stability." This approach, which avoided escalating confrontations with Gaza, was the operational assumption for Bar and Halevi.

Despite early warning signs on the morning of October 7th, including increased activity in Gaza and communications between Islamic Jihad and Hamas, the security establishment assessed it as a drill. Both Bar and Halevi believed that Israeli military actions could provoke Hamas into an attack, a scenario they sought to avoid, interpreting this as "miscalculation." A former senior Israeli official acknowledged a failure in understanding the situation but argued that without an immediate perceived threat, avoiding provocative actions, consistent with Netanyahu's own policy, was deemed appropriate.

Ronen Bar did initiate the deployment of a covert unit, "Team Tequila," to southern Gaza as a precaution. However, contrary to claims of deliberately withholding information, the IDF's intelligence hub alerted Netanyahu's intelligence aide at 4 AM, two and a half hours before the attack. The aide, based on the intelligence received, which suggested routine Hamas activity, decided not to wake the Prime Minister, a decision deemed reasonable by former officials given the available information and protocol for waking the premier only when immediate action was required.

Netanyahu was first alerted by his military secretary at 6:29 AM, after the attack had begun. He questioned the lack of prior intelligence and inquired about extensive reserve mobilization and the possibility of eliminating Hamas leadership. He arrived at IDF headquarters later that morning, and a significant operational assessment, including ordering a complete border closure and full reserve mobilization, only occurred at 9:55 AM. This timeline contradicts reports that Netanyahu's first directive was to prevent abductions, as the order for border closure was given during the 9:55 AM assessment.