Shin Bet Chief's 'Sole Responsibility' Claim Recalls Historical Failures

Shin Bet Director David Zini's declaration of "sole responsibility" for the decision not to provide security detail for former IDF Chief of Staff and Yisrael Beiteinu party chairman Gadi Eisenkot has drawn parallels to historical instances where bold claims of responsibility preceded disastrous outcomes. While Zini's statement, made in late August, appears to signal leadership, historical examples suggest such declarations do not guarantee the correctness of a decision or shield the public from its consequences.

One such case involved German Admiral Henning von Holtzendorff in December 1916. Facing a stalemate in World War I, Holtzendorff advocated for unrestricted submarine warfare, assuring Kaiser Wilhelm II that Britain would sue for peace within five months and that the United States would not enter the war. Despite his "word as an officer" that no American would land in Europe, Germany launched unrestricted submarine warfare in February 1917. While initially successful, the sinking of American ships was a major factor in the U.S. declaring war on Germany, leading to over two million American soldiers landing in Europe by the war's end. Holtzendorff, however, was promoted and survived the war.

Another example is U.S. General Dwight D. Eisenhower during the D-Day landings in June 1944. Facing adverse weather and the risk of the invasion plan being discovered, Eisenhower made the critical decision to proceed with the Normandy invasion. He prepared a statement taking "full responsibility" if the invasion failed, emphasizing the decision was based on the best available information. The invasion succeeded, and Eisenhower later became President.

In July 1870, French Minister of War Marshal Edmond Leboeuf assured parliament that the French army was fully prepared for war with Prussia, stating they wouldn't even need to buy a button for soldiers' leggings. Four days later, France declared war. The army proved unprepared, suffering swift defeats and the collapse of the Second French Empire. Leboeuf was dismissed and later captured, but faced no judicial repercussions for his assurances.

These historical precedents highlight the potential disconnect between accepting responsibility and the actual consequences of a flawed decision. Zini's statement comes as an advisory committee recommended approving security for Eisenkot, a leading figure in the polls, until the elections. The final decision rests with a ministerial committee, with the author emphasizing the potential national ramifications of an attack on Eisenkot given Israel's current security and political climate.