Saudi Arabia’s Security Dependence on Turkey and Pakistan Challenges Israel’s Regional Role

Saudi Arabia’s recent security agreement, known as the "Strike Agreement," has deeply integrated Turkey and Pakistan into the kingdom’s core defense framework, granting them market access, capital, production, maintenance, status, and influence in exchange for security guarantees. However, these three countries do not share a common enemy: India is not hostile to Saudi Arabia, and neither Ankara nor Islamabad are engaged in Riyadh’s conflict with Iran, as both maintain necessary relations with Tehran. In contrast, Israel and Saudi Arabia share a front against Iran and its proxies, including the Houthis, pro-Iranian militias in Iraq, and Hezbollah.

Despite the new agreement, attacks by the Houthis on Saudi oil infrastructure resumed shortly after its signing. Pakistan, under a previous defense pact with Riyadh, remained out of the conflict even as hundreds of missiles and drones from Iran and its proxies struck Saudi territory. The new pact stipulates that an attack on one is an attack on all, but assistance is subject to consultation and has not materialized. The U.S. Treasury documented millions of dollars from Iran’s Quds Force being funneled through the Turkish company Al Aman Kargo to the Houthi network attacking Saudi oil and shipping. This company was established months after the Turkish government closed an investigation into the Quds Force network, dismissing investigators and dropping charges. Components sourced in Germany and routed through Turkey were later found in missiles fired at Saudi Arabia. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan condemned attacks on the Houthis and praised their "successful defense," while Houthi leader Mohammed Ali al-Houthi clarified that Turkey is not a target, naming Israel as the enemy.

Saudi Arabia already benefits from Israeli intelligence and defense cooperation without formal diplomatic ties. Israel is integrated into the regional warning and defense system coordinated by the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), sharing intelligence with Saudi Arabia and briefing on Turkish activities that threaten Saudi national security. Advanced sensors, radars, secure communications, and aerial surveillance are linked in this network, with additional classified layers.

The Strike Agreement alters Saudi Arabia’s security portfolio but does not diminish its strategic importance. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Erdogan, and Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif engaged in talks before October 7 on a deal linking Saudi recognition of Israel to a U.S.-backed security framework, economic components, and a civilian nuclear core. This was part of broader regional connectivity initiatives, including the IMEC economic corridor launched at the G20 summit in New Delhi, connecting India to Europe via the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Israel, Cyprus, and Greece. This corridor competes with the Middle Corridor through Turkey and Central Asia. The October 7 attacks halted normalization efforts and froze the political logic of IMEC, increasing the strategic value of the Turkish route.

Washington added Kazakhstan to the Abraham Accords in November 2025, a country with full diplomatic ties to Israel since 1992 and a key node in the Middle Corridor. The Trump administration branded competing regional architectures under the Abraham Accords to obscure U.S. strategic choices. Saudi Arabia could reshape the regional map through these accords but insists on a Palestinian state as a condition for normalization. Turkey’s support for Hamas and weakening of the Palestinian Authority perpetuates division and obstructs a two-state solution. Israel requires separation, not symbolic gestures to Riyadh: a demilitarized Palestinian state, disarmed Hamas, a functioning Palestinian Authority, and security mechanisms to prevent another October 7-style attack.

Annexing millions of Palestinians without full rights would end Israeli democracy; a one-state solution threatens the Jewish majority. There is no third formula to resolve this demographic challenge. Normalization is not a reward granted by Riyadh but a strategic shift replacing dependence on Turkey and Pakistan with American security guarantees, Israeli strategic depth, Indian influence, and European connectivity via IMEC. For Riyadh, this restores sovereignty. Saudi Vision 2030, aiming to diversify the economy beyond oil and become an investment, industrial, and logistics hub, relies on connectivity. IMEC transforms Saudi geography into power. A U.S.-supervised Saudi civilian nuclear program aligns with Israeli interests. The alternative is Saudi reliance on Russia, China, or Pakistan. The Akkuyu nuclear plant in Turkey, controlled by Russia and monitored by Israel, sets a precedent. Any deviation or militarization could escalate risks.

The July U.S.-Saudi agreement lacks the additional IAEA protocol allowing inspectors access to undeclared sites with short notice, a baseline condition for Israel. Without Saudi control over enrichment or reprocessing and excluding Turkey and Pakistan from sensitive nuclear circles, Israeli oversight will limit intelligence and operational data flow to infrastructure accessible to Ankara or Islamabad. Regional connectivity will exclude them from critical nodes. Riyadh will pay the premium of the Strike Agreement until it removes Turkey and Pakistan from its core security circle.

The article’s author is the founder and director of Line of State, an international strategic firm advising governments and decision-makers on complex security and strategic issues.