President Donald Trump’s call on Tuesday, on the sidelines of the G7 summit in France, for Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to act against Hezbollah in Lebanon is being read as the clearest public push yet for Damascus to confront the group. The article argues that the request exposes a contradictory U.S. approach: Washington is trying to stabilize al-Sharaa’s new regime while also pressing it toward a risky conflict that could undermine Syria’s recovery and destabilize the region.
The idea is not new. In March, amid the early stages of the war with Iran, reports and rumors circulated that Syria might move into Lebanon to fight Hezbollah. A Reuters report on March 17 said the United States had encouraged Syria to consider action against Hezbollah, including deploying forces in eastern Lebanon, as part of a broader effort to curb Iranian influence. Damascus was said to be hesitant because of fears of a wider regional war and internal sectarian tensions, and U.S. envoy to Syria Tom Barrack later denied the report as false and inaccurate.
According to the analysis, Washington has spent the past year helping al-Sharaa consolidate power, lift sanctions, gain diplomatic legitimacy, and attract foreign investment. Asking Syria to open a front in Lebanon, the piece says, would drain resources, disrupt priorities, and jeopardize the state-building project. Al-Sharaa has already told regional leaders his force buildup is defensive, and he has told Lebanon’s president that Syria supports Lebanese stability, sovereignty, and efforts to disarm Hezbollah.
The article says a Syrian intervention in Lebanon would also revive painful memories of Syria’s 1976 to 2005 occupation, harm the fragile trust rebuilding between the two countries, and run against Turkey’s opposition to Syrian involvement in Lebanon. It could also make al-Sharaa look like he is serving Israeli interests, a narrative already circulating online in Syria. Israel has not officially commented, but the piece says some in Israel may see an opportunity to weaken Hezbollah, while others fear al-Sharaa’s jihadist past and possible future ambitions. The author concludes that the key question is not only whether al-Sharaa is willing to fight Hezbollah, but whether the United States truly wants him to do so.
